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 In philosophy, there are generally two ways in which a project can seem 
ridiculous at its outset.  There are certain philosophical inquiries that initially seem 
laughable in the complexity of their telos – Hegel’s Phenomenology of Geist, towards 
‘Absolute Knowing,’ serves as a good example.  But on the other hand, there are also 
philosophical inquiries that initially seem laughable in the simplicity of their telos – 
texts that seek to define a concept that seems so near to us, so seemingly obvious, that 
any inquiry whatsoever into that concept’s nature seems gratuitous.  The initial 
inquiries into the nature of language, for instance, must have appeared to be ludicrous 
at first – language is one of those things that most people assume to just know.  
This project is one of the latter types of inquiries – it seeks to ask a question that 
very few people ever think to ask: what, exactly, is a doctor?  Even within the field of 
the philosophy of medicine, this question is almost never raised – thinkers are too tied 
up with ethical dilemmas and questions about the nature of scientific evidence to ask 
the glaring question at hand.  I haven’t been able to find a reason why this question is 
never addressed.  It certainly seems to me like an extraordinarily important issue – and 
hopefully, at the end of this discussion, the reader will agree.  It seems that the 
physician, or anyone at that, must fully understand his project in order to carry it out 
effectively. 
Hence, the telos of this project is twofold – in Part I, I will attempt to solidify the 
goal of the physician in medical practice, and in Part II, I will examine the specific ways 
by which the doctor can actualize that goal.  In other words, the central questions are: 
1) What is the goal of the physician? and 2) How is the physician to accomplish or 
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actualize that goal?  At first glance, the project seems incredibly simple – the doctor is 
supposed to make you healthy, and he is to accomplish this through medicine.  It seems 
that all people have an inherent understanding of health – that health should be a 
simple concept that we just know.  However, this is certainly not the case. 
But rather than try to complicate the seemingly simple nature of the discussion 
before it starts, the movement of this project seeks to embrace it.  That is, the 
organization of the paper is based around deep explorations of the natural assumptions 
about medicine.  Hence, the discussion of health will be used as a jumping-off point, as 
it were, for the examination of the goal of the physician in medicine – health is what the 
physician seems to strive towards.  In Section 1, five different preexisting notions of 
health will be explored, in order to orient us in our project.  In Section 2, the underlying 
philosophical issues of Section 1 will be explicated, bringing us to a fuller, more 
theoretically grounded notion of what the physician is, or should be, striving towards in 
the practice of medicine. 
Once we have a firm grasp on the goal of the physician, we will move into the 
second part of the project, exploring how the physician is supposed to move towards 
this newly-understood goal.  The obvious movement here is to suggest that the doctor 
will achieve his goal through medicine.  Again, we will allow what seems apparent and 
natural to guide our discussion.  Section 3, then, will examine the two most common 
medical paradigms in an attempt to explore how systematized medicine can serve as a 
way for the physician to accomplish his goal.  And finally, Section 4 will attempt to 
elaborate upon, or specify, the way the doctor is to accomplish his goal by examining 
the specific clinical interaction.  At the conclusion of these four sections, the hope is 
that a clear notion of the physician’s project – both what it is and how it is to be 
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accomplished – will be derived. 
I also want to note that it was originally my intention to clearly explain the 
importance of this analysis of medicine, but I believe it will hold more weight to the 
reader if he or she comes to see this importance for his or her self, by means of the 
movement through the sections.  I will note, however, that it is a secondary goal of this 
project to illuminate how incredibly important it is to examine medicine 
philosophically.  I will not say more, and I will not give a blatant reason as to why, but I 



















Part I: Establishing the Goal of the Physician 
 
Section 1: The Common Notions of Health 
Although it seems natural to assume that establishing health in the patient is the 
ultimate goal of the physician, a complete idea of health is not so easily defined.  
Without an in-depth analysis, it seems that health is a simple concept that is easily 
understood in a descriptive way.  Because so many specific maladies of the human body 
are named, isolated, and spoken about so plainly and clearly in the context of health, 
most people in contemporary American society have become accustomed to defining 
health against a malady or negative bodily condition.  That is, because it has become 
the norm in our culture to seek medical counsel only (for the most part) in the event 
that we have a specific plight or complaint, we have come to understand the concepts of 
health and disease in an antonymous way.  For most Americans, health is the opposite 
of, or more specifically the absence of, disease - health is generally viewed as our 
baseline state of being, and disease is understood as a specific imposition upon that 
state. Even the Webster definition supports this assertion - with regard to the human 
body, health is simply defined as ‘the condition of being well or free from disease.’ 
But when the question of the notion of health is addressed more directly and 
explicitly, it becomes exceedingly complicated.  Health reveals itself as a concept that is 
open for very extensive debate, giving rise to a plentitude of analyses and assertions 
about a correct understanding.  The latter quarter of the twentieth century has given 
rise to an extremely intense discussion regarding the nature of health and its meaning 
amongst philosophers and medical professionals alike, resulting in a compilation of 
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several very specific definitions.  Although the scope of this project will not allow me to 
address all of these specific claims, I do hope to arrive at a definition of health that is 
useful for the sake of examining the interaction between the physician and patient.  
What we hope to do here is establish a practical basis for the understanding of the telos 
of medical practice, upon which we can build the rest of the discussion.  
 This does not mean that a specific definition needs to be realized, but rather, 
that the practical implications of health, in terms of medicine, need to be explored.  It is 
because of this that I choose to organize the discussion according to what I perceive to 
be five definitions of health that are linguistically non-philosophical - ‘layman’s’ 
definitions of health, so to speak.  They will however, move from one end of the 
philosophical spectrum to the other, for the most part - from the philosophically 
descriptivist, almost entirely biomedical understanding of health on one hand to the 
very philosophically normative, highly holistic understanding of health on the other 
end - but this simple terminology will hopefully keep the definitions grounded in the 
practical reality that relates to my overall project.  The five definitions are: 
 
1. Health is the lack of disease or sickness. 
2. Health is the state of being within biostatistical norms. 
3. Health is the state in which an organism is able to properly function. 
3. Health is a state in which one is able to properly function in the world. 
4. Health is a state in which one is able to achieve vital goals in their life. 
  
 Once the preexisting theories have been explored, I will attempt to establish my 
own concept of health that will be the most useful for the sake of the doctor/patient 
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relationship.  It may be noted here that it is possible to discuss the concept of health in 
many different contexts, and theories of health are often postulated for many different 
reasons.  Some of the theories that I will discuss are exploring health as a project in 
ontology, searching only for a theoretical notion of a concept, while others attempt to 
draw distinctions and lines of demarcation for the sake of practical implications in 
fields such as medical insurance or law.  I therefore find it necessary to stress the point 
that this exploration of the concept of health, as well as the entire first part of this 
project, will move forward in the context of the pure interaction between doctor and 
patient.  I am searching for a notion of health that will serve as a desired teleological 
outcome in the project of the physician - not as a legal stipulation or a purely 
theoretical notion. 
 
Health as the lack of disease 
 
 The question of the nature of health almost always accompanies an inquiry into 
the nature of disease.  As discussed previously, it has become a subconscious 
assumption, at least in our own culture, that health and disease are inherently related.  
And even in philosophical writing, there is almost never a discussion of health without 
a discussion of disease - we have come to use the terms ‘sick’ (or ‘ill’) and ‘healthy’ as 
the two opposite poles of our state of being.  And because the term ‘disease’ is the most 
common term for the cause of a ‘sick’ or ‘ill’ state, the concept of the disease has 
become the evil entity that opposes and impedes upon our normal state – one of health. 
 Even in contemporary medical education, the concept of diagnosis is central to 
an understanding of proper practice - a doctor is not trained to look for health.  Rather, 
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they are trained to isolate and identify different diseases (Scadding).  Because there can 
be so many different kinds of disease - so many maladies with clear, objective, easily 
stated criteria - it is very easy to define the concept of disease simply as a set, or group, 
of all of these specific instances of disease.  That is, the whole concept of disease itself is 
easily defined as a summation of all the individual diseases.  Disease becomes tangible 
and isolatable - one can easily point to a thing and label it as ‘disease’ - while health 
remains entirely abstract.  There are no named, isolatable ‘instances’ of health.  This 
conceptualization of medicine as diagnosing malady tends to lead patients and doctors 
alike to the natural assumption that disease is a deviation from the normal state, 
leaving health simply as a lack.   
 Furthermore, some thinkers have come to conceptualize disease as prior, in 
some way, to health.  The ‘reverse theory of health,’ described by K. W. M. Fulford, is 
based upon the notion that disease must be given an epistemic priority over health in 
our natural experience of the world.  The argument is fairly simple - because we don’t 
actively experience health until we experience disease, it is really disease that gives rise 
to health (experientially), and not vice versa.  That is, if a person were healthy for all of 
their life, they would never recognize the notion of health.  Interestingly, disease would 
then not be considered a deviation from health, but rather, an experience in and of 
itself.  It would only be once that disease passed that the person would experience 
health, rendering disease the truly powerful and unavoidable state of our being 
(Fulford).  With this reading, it would no longer be useful or desirable to discuss health 
without disease.  Rather, it would be impossible to discuss health without disease.   
So, it seems that from an experiential perspective, it is clear that one should 
consider health to be the opposite of disease.  It is true that from an epistemic 
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perspective, we only actively experience health in relation to some other state, which is 
most commonly one of disease.  Growing up, many of us think of health as the end goal 
of ‘getting better’ after a malady - it is experienced as a state of recovery.  But I think 
this assertion of disease’s priority is quickly eliminated when one looks at the reality of 
every day life.  If we are speaking experientially, how could one make the argument that 
one does not feel better or worse on one day than they did on another?  Even without 
the presence of disease, the way in which we experience the world, and experience the 
body, is constantly in flux.  It is not necessary for a biomedically recognized malady to 
be introduced to our bodies in order for us to recognize positivity in our state of being. 
(This will be greatly elaborated upon in the following chapter.) 
But regardless of the question of epistemic priority, the entire notion that 
recovering from disease leads to health – or even the idea that acquiring a disease leads 
to a lack of health – is created largely by our understanding of reason.  Sadegh-Zadeh 
points out a clear fact about our perception of health and disease - our natural 
reasoning is entirely Aristotelian when it comes to the distinction between the two.  
This leads us to assume a few things about the two concepts.  We assume that a person 
is either healthy or not healthy, but not at the same time, and we assume that an 
individual is ill1 or not ill, but not both at the same time.  And as described above, our 
epistemic experience of the world has led us to believe that these two concepts are in 
strict opposition to one another.  We have therefore come to understand each concept 
as the lack of the other – ‘not ill’ is synonymous with ‘healthy’ and ‘not healthy’ is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 ‘Ill’ here refers to a state of disease - the distinction between illness and disease is a 
question of medical demarcation and is really unnecessary for this discussion - when I 




synonymous with ‘ill.’ 
It seems that this is an intuitive reality - that it is an unavoidable truth that an 
unhealthy person is not a healthy person, and because of our perceived definition of the 
way the two concepts work, that the person must be ill.  But in examining the 
diagnostic process, we see that this view might be problematic.  When the doctor is 
examining the patient, he or she, as Scadding points out, is searching for 
malfunctioning of some kind.  If this malfunctioning is discovered and the cause is 
isolated, this experience of causal malfunctioning (the combination of cause and effect) 
will likely be dubbed a disease (or illness or syndrome) and named - strep throat, for 
example.  I think Scadding makes an unwarranted jump at this point - he would then 
say that the patient is in a state of disease, and hence is not in a state of health.  There 
are two problems with this.   
One is highlighted by Sadegh-Zadeh - the fact that a person is ill does not 
necessarily mean that they are not also healthy.  This is an assumption based on our 
innate understanding of reason in a basic Aristotelian way, and it is very possible that 
this is a totally flawed assumption.  That is, linguistically, and logically, any state 
cannot both be and not be at the same time.  When we use the phrase “The sky is blue,” 
it naturally seems to follow that we also mean “The sky is not not blue.”  This is 
obviously made clear in symbolic logic by the rules of negation – we draw the 
assumption that there can be blue, and there can be not blue, but not both in the same 
thing at the same time. 
And yet, we see these types of things every day – things that are both blue and 
not blue.  In some of his dialogues, Plato even addresses this issue in the Republic, for 
instance, during his discussion of Being, he notes that any quality that exists in a thing 
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also does not exist in that thing.  He uses the famous example of the beautiful – 
anything that is beautiful is also in some way not beautiful.  It is not at all difficult to 
see how this would apply to health.  There are always ways in which we would call 
ourselves healthy, but could we not, realistically, always find something about our state 
that is wrong in some way?  It seems that we can always find something that we would 
want ‘fixed’ by the doctor.  And yet, we go on considering ourselves healthy.  Clearly, we 
can – and are – always both healthy and not healthy.  And as soon as we can isolate 
that thing that is not ‘good’ about our state, it becomes a disease, by our previous 
definition.  Hence, it is nearly always the case that health and disease exist in us 
simultaneously.  The simple fact that a person is ill does not mean that they are not 
healthy.  It seems that our experiential way of understanding health and disease does 
not hold. 
The other problem with Scadding’s assertion follows from this realization, and 
pertains to the distinction between ‘having a disease’ and ‘being in a state of disease.’  It 
does not necessarily follow that the whole person has somehow ‘lost’ their health just 
because a single system within their body is not functioning properly.  Even if health 
were to be understood as the lack of disease, it would not necessarily follow that the 
person is in an overall state of disease because of a single malfunction. 
But despite all that has been said, even if we were to accept the fact that health is 
the lack of disease, isolating a specific disease is not always as easy as isolating a strand 
of bacteria.  That is, even if health were simply the opposite of disease, how would one 
universally set the distinction between disease and health?  Consider the case of high 
cholesterol – it is considered to be a disease, but what is it that denotes its presence?  
There is no pathogen that has invaded the body of the patient; no observable lack of 
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ability that is clearly causally attributed to the condition.  It seems that there are many 
diseases that are not as easy to isolate and identify as Scadding assumes.  This problem, 
in addition to the previously mentioned issues, suggests that there needs to be more 
specific criteria that denotes health, and a lack thereof.  Through this discussion, it has 
been realized that the ‘everyday,’ natural, experiential way of looking at health and 
disease as opposites leaves us with a very undeveloped notion.  If health and disease are 
to be understood in opposition to one another, there needs to be a clearer, technical 
way of doing so. 
 
Health as a biostatistical norm 
 
 Clearly, the previous discussion gives rise to a very important question regarding 
health and disease - even if health were the absence of disease, what then, exactly, 
would designate the difference?  In this section, we will explore the way in which most 
scientists answer this question.  To clarify, it is not the goal of this section to determine 
an overall understanding of the concept of a disease.  Rather, the point of this section is 
to rethink the possibility of dividing the two concepts.   
In the previous section, it became clear that the concept of disease could simply 
be understood as the set of all diseases.  Furthermore, it was determined that lines of 
demarcation between biological conditions that are and are not diseases are not so 
easily drawn.  It is the object of this section to further clarify the difference between the 
two - health and disease - in order to illuminate what exactly the doctor is trying to 
move towards, and what the doctor is trying to move away from, in terms of the state of 
his or her patient. 
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 In the previous section, diseases were roughly conceptualized as the named 
maladies that negatively affect a biological system in a person - essentially, as the 
isolated examples of perceived ill-health.  Obviously, this is inherently problematic for 
most philosophers of medicine, for a number of reasons.  But the primary issue with 
this understanding lies with the question of inclusion and exclusion in the categories.  
In conceptualizing health and disease as opposites, which biological conditions qualify 
as a disease, and which qualify as health?  That is, when a physician finds a new 
condition of the body that has not been observed before clinically, what is it about that 
condition that leads the scientist to deem it as a disease?  Saying that it negatively 
affects health would obviously be circular for the sake of our argument - so there needs 
to be something else that qualifies these conditions as ‘disease’ or ‘lack of health’ in 
order to ground and solidify the ‘opposite of disease theory’ of health, or what we will 
come to describe as the descriptivist theory. 
 Christopher Boorse (1977) is the leading thinker in this camp, having published 
multiple books and articles that have been extremely widely cited by other philosophers 
of health.  His theory is considered the biostatistical theory of health (BST), and from a 
philosophical perspective, is highly descriptive - his argument rests on the assertion 
that health is an empirical, objective, value free concept.  In short, he draws the 
distinction between the two objective concepts of health and disease by considering the 
statistical norms of a reference class.  Boorse’s concept of health simply refers to 
normal functioning, while the concept of disease refers to abnormal functioning.  
Because of this, health becomes completely objective and only discoverable by natural 
science - any evaluation or judgment by a subjective observer is completely irrelevant.   
 According to BST, health is a statistically typical contribution of all processes 
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and components of a person towards the overall goal of the person - survival and 
reproduction.  The term ‘statistically typical’ refers to the statistical norm within a 
reference group, and is not necessarily representative of the entire population of 
humans - obviously, the statistical norms of a twenty-year-old male are not the same as 
those of a ninety-year-old woman.  The point of Boorse’s theory is that health is a clear-
cut notion.  It is not tied up with any sort of subjective value, in that its end or goal is 
determined biologically.  Similarly, the concept of disease is simply a biostatistically 
determined lack of such functioning.  It would seem that this notion put forward by 
Boorse is quite simple and easily acceptable - if each system in a person’s body is 
functioning in a way that is objectively determined to be biologically normal, it would 
seem that they must be in good health.   
 But once again, some major problems arise, both in terms of his formulation of 
the specifics of the theory and with the question of the basis of the theory as a whole.  
Within the theory, the description and formulation of the reference class is quite 
problematic (Kingma).  Boorse himself describes the idea of a reference class as a group 
that has the same functional design, by nature (Boorse, 1977, p. 562).  Clearly, this 
leaves a lot up for interpretation.  The theory makes sense when one conceptualizes the 
reference class simply by age and gender, but how do other natural characteristics of a 
person come into play?  Things like religion and environment are clearly intentionally 
excluded by his definition, in an attempt to universalize the concept.  But consider the 
instance of a reference class such as ‘twenty year old males who are blind.’  They all 
have the same functional design, by nature.  So, if each individual in the set has 
similarly functioning biological systems – regardless of the fact that they are blind – 
then they are all in a state of health, according to Boorse, despite the fact that blindness 
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is commonly considered to be a state of disease in other reference classes.  Now, it 
would make sense for one to say that a reference class cannot be based on something 
that is a disease, but obviously, this would be a circular argument (Kingma).  This 
ambiguity muddles the objectivity of his theory - and there are certainly other examples 
that would be equally problematic.   
 The other major issue with the BST as a whole also arises out of the specific 
example given above.  From Boorse’s perspective, the twenty year old blind male who is 
biologically functioning completely normally would still seem like he should be in a 
state of disease, given the fact that blindness is a biologically abnormal and detrimental 
condition in many other reference classes.  Hence, if one removed the stipulation of 
blindness from the reference class, that same twenty year old male would never be able 
to be in a state of health.  That person could live to the age of 105, have three children 
and lead a completely happy life, but Boorse would still argue that he lived a life laden 
by disease, never achieving health.   
To use another example, how would Boorse view a person living with an obscure 
allergy or a person with a transplanted heart?  They are biostatistical outliers, but are 
they really in an eternal state of disease?  Furthermore, what would Boorse say about a 
twenty year old male who is utterly miserable, but biostatistically normal?  Because we 
are examining health in the context of the doctor and patient, these questions must be 
raised. 
 Boorse recognizes these problems with his theory, and in response, draws 
another distinction between theoretical health (what was just discussed) and practical 
health.  He defines practical health as the opposite of illness, which he defines as an 
‘undesirable’ disease (Boorse, 1976, p. 68).  In order to keep his theory grounded in 
	   
18 
objectivity, he adds that the lack of desirability must have some link to the design of the 
species - that a disease must be undesirable because it is impeding upon some 
biological process.  In his attempt to explain the clinical setting, and open a more 
realistic understanding of health, he moves from a descriptivist, objective 
understanding of health to a very undeveloped normative one (Fedoryka).  Regardless 
of how Boorse presents it, there is clearly an evaluation that must take place in the 
clinical setting in order to determine practical health.  The question of ‘conformity to 
species design’ is vague and unhelpful, especially from a clinical perspective.  It pushes 
the realm of medicine into one that is no longer rooted in objective science, but rather 
rooted in a specific doctor’s understanding of objective science.  As Fedoryka points 
out, this movement towards practical health is really just a shift towards an 
undeveloped normative theory.   
 By arriving at this practical notion, we are confronted by a fundamental reality 
of clinical health - it seems that it is almost unavoidable to incorporate at least some 
normativity in a useful definition.  This is not to say that the BST cannot be useful, but 
it seems that it is not enough to encompass what a proper notion of health is in a 
clinical setting.  That is, it does not do us any good in our project of defining the goal of 
the physician.  From this analysis, it seems that health is something inherently tied to 






Health as the state in which an organism is able to properly function2 
 
Moving towards a normative conception of health gives rise to a plethora of 
different nuanced theories about the notion of health.  The obvious problem with a 
movement into the realm of normativity is that any objective, universally applicable 
understanding of health that is strived for by the descriptivist seems to be lost.  It is 
because of this issue that many thinkers try to come up with a way of utilizing a 
normative description in a somewhat objective way3.  For example, in her article 
“Health as a Normative Concept: Towards a New Conceptual Framework,” Kateryna 
Fedoryka makes the claim that health is, ‘a dimension of the good of a being which is a 
direct function of the nature of that being’ (p. 155) and ‘a dimension of the individual in 
which a certain unfolding of being happens in virtue of the natural structure of that 
being’ (p. 155).  In this definition, it is acknowledged that health is a movement towards 
a goal - natural actualization - and this goal is the reference point to which functions 
are considered to be good.  There is clearly a normative element, in that the function is 
labeled as good, but by considering the goal ‘natural actualization,’ Fedoryka avoids the 
subject’s influence on the definition.  Natural actualization is something determined by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  At this point in the discussion, with the movement from descriptivism to 
normativism, explicit discussion of the concept of disease is largely abandoned – it no 
longer serves as a useful concept in establishing the goal of the physician.  As will 
become clear, an objective understanding of the exclusion/inclusion criteria for disease 
will not be particularly important to the physician’s project, nor to this project.	  
3 It seems that many philosophers of medicine are tied up with the idea that a 
‘universal’ definition of health has to be solidified, so that the project of medicine can 
transcend the boundaries of culture, religion, etc.  It seems that they are seeking 
justification for the imposition of ‘medical care’ on any and all populations, and this 
could be for a wide variety of reasons – legal, economic, even ethical.  But as it will be 
seen, this drive towards a universally understood definition of ‘health’ is both 
unnecessary and unnatural. 
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biology.  It is a state generated by the structure of the organism itself – a state in which 
the systems of an organism would be functioning in a way that would actualize the 
organism, given that there is no negative outside influence from the will.  In “Health as 
an Objective Value,” Lennox argues that health is necessarily normative in a similar 
way - that the concept of health refers to a state in which all of an organisms goal-
oriented biological systems are contributing to the overall goal of life.  The fact that the 
goal of an organism is to sustain life should, according to Lennox, be implicitly 
understood. 
 Both of these theories claiming to be based on ‘objective value’ seem to be 
attempts to rework the ideas of Boorse in order to fix the ‘practical health’ issue.  They 
seem to be attempts at bridging his two notions in order to establish one that is as 
objective as the theoretical while acknowledging the inherent normativity of the 
practical.  But it is important to understand and acknowledge the fact that in drawing 
the distinction between the two, Boorse was not only acknowledging that health has a 
normative dimension in addition to the descriptivist dimension.  I think, judging even 
by the names ‘theoretical’ and ‘practical,’ that Boorse was also acknowledging the fact 
that his theoretical concept could only be applicable in theory - and the ‘objective value’ 
approach suffers from the same shortcoming.   
By shifting to the practical, Boorse was certainly acknowledging the inherent 
need for a normative influence, but what gives rise to this inherent normativity is the 
fact that all instances of health are already in the world, to use Heidegger’s 
terminology.  Both Lennox and Fedoryka claim that health is a state in which an 
organism can accomplish the goal of life - the state in which it can successfully actualize 
itself naturally.  But both have similarly ignored the fact that the environment in which 
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an organism lives is never constant, and is very influential on an organism’s ability to 
actualize itself.  This idea solves many of the problems that arise in the discussion of 
biostatistics, but completely ignores the practical reality of health. 
 In the attempt to make health objective and only value-laden in so far as biology 
dictates a goal (avoiding true worldliness in the definition), Lennox and Fedoryka have 
ignored the fundamental fact that the biological systems are always functioning, or 
actualizing, in the world.  Once a person is in the world, a reciprocal relationship 
emerges immediately.  The person is no longer able to be viewed in and of itself – it 
must be recognized that the person can affect the world, and that the world can affect 
that person.  The best way to discuss worldliness in practical, non-Heideggerian terms 
is to view the duality as a relationship between a willing subject and an external 
environment. 
 
Health as the state in which one is able to properly function in the world 
 
Because all biological systems are already in the world, all of these systems are 
open to, and influenced by, the environment and the will.  It is impossible to isolate the 
activity of any biological system in a realistic sense - the human body is not self-
perpetuating.  The metabolism cannot properly function without the intake of food, for 
example. And this intake of food can only happen if the person wills to eat the food, and 
receives the food from his or her environment. 
The will and the environment then necessarily become a part of these seemingly 
isolated biological systems.  Even on a medical or scientific level, it is impossible to 
isolate and evaluate the efficacy of the human body in and of itself - all biological 
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systems need something from the outside world, whether that be oxygen, water, 
glucose, a certain protein or vitamin, etc.  It is not like trying to evaluate the state of a 
car without a driver or gasoline – it is impossible, and useless, to evaluate a person’s 
body while ignoring their mind and environment.  In the diagnostic process of a 
mechanic, he can easily make a statement like, “This car just needs a different driver” 
or “You have to use different oil, a higher quality of gas and stop driving it off road.”  
In the case of a human, this is not so simple.  The doctor can’t simply proclaim, “Your 
body is fine, you just need different desires, passions and tendencies,” and think that 
the problem is solved.  Similarly, the doctor cannot make the claim that a patient 
simply needs to move to a different area of the world and adopt an entirely new way of 
life – at least in a realistic and useful sense.  It is therefore useless – and arguably 
impossible – to discuss an organism while disregarding its environment and will.   
 If the environment and the will are taken into account, the conception of health 
changes significantly.  Health becomes the state in which an organism has an active and 
successful relationship with the environment.  Conceptualized in these terms, health is 
both a state and an order - as a state, health is the body’s ability to handle the 
difficulties imposed upon it by the environment, and as an order, it is the body’s ability 
to expand and actualize its possibilities (Mordacci, 487).  Clearly, the necessary 
imposition of the environment and the will upon health significantly reduces the 
amount of clarity that the definition has.   
The idea that health is the ability to adapt to and thrive in an environment is 
much more vague and ambiguous than the previously discussed definitions - in 
accepting that the notion of health is now opened to the environment, it must be 
recognized that it is opened to the totality of an environment, or in other words, a 
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world.  This does not only include the physical environment, but also the social, 
political, and moral environment (Kovacs).  And in opening health to the influence of 
the will, we are confronted with the question of how subjective intentions and 
evaluations will affect the notion. 
 Through this movement, the idea that health is an organism’s ability to ‘function 
in the world’ has been greatly expanded.  By ‘function in the world,’ we no longer mean 
exist as an isolated organism that can actualize some biological processes in order to 
sustain life.  The phrase now implies that an organism must be able to actively and 
successfully participate with its world.  Naturally, a number of questions arise here.  
How far can the domain of health be expanded into the involvement with the world?  
How exactly are we to understand this notion?  
 Before moving forward, let us revert to the original intention of this project - to 
identify health as the teleological goal of the doctor/patient interaction.  It may seem 
that the notion of health that we’ve arrived at is leaving the realm of medicine, but this 
is not the case.  What seems to be happening, rather, is that the notion of health, and 
therefore the project of the doctor, is expanding out from the realm of biology.  With 
this expanding view of health, the project of the doctor is expanding beyond the 
concept of a ‘biological human technician.’  It may be useful here to ground the 
movement in an example. 
 Consider the woman who comes into the doctor’s office on a Monday afternoon 
for a check-up.  During the physical examination, the doctor finds patterned bruising 
on her back, which is clearly the result of blunt trauma, but other than this, her 
biological systems seem to be functioning fine.  The doctor also notices that she is tired 
and disheveled - her hair is matted and her eyes bloodshot.  At the end of the exam, she 
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explicitly mentions to the doctor that she is in a violent relationship and that it she is 
worried that she may lose her job because of the toll it is taking on her.  Considering 
this patient as an isolated organism, the doctor would deem her to be in a state of 
health - all biological systems are doing their job, and are even within biostatistical 
norms.  Without considering her environment or will, the doctor’s job would be done - 
according to the previous definitions of health, this woman is perfectly fine, and it 
would not be the doctor’s job to impose on any activities or events in her life that are 
unrelated to her health.   
On the other hand, if he expanded his understanding of health, he would view 
her violent relationship as an impediment on her health - he would acknowledge the 
fact that her environment was disallowing her from achieving health, and help her in 
any way he could to alter or overcome the plights in her environment that were 
harming her.  When she thanked him, he would be able to rationalize his actions by 
explaining that it is his job as a doctor to make sure she is healthy.  Clearly, 
environmental context has to be considered in the determination of overall health - it 
cannot just be an objective evaluation of all the isolated biological systems of a person. 
 But consider another more puzzling example.  Consider a woman with the same 
conditions, but this time, place her in Country X.  She is still disheveled and beaten by 
her husband, but in the culture, this is normal.  By considering the totality of her 
environment, it would seem that she is in a state of health - she is functioning perfectly 
well for the cultural standards.  But as a western observer, it still seems that this is in 
some way wrong - that her environment is detrimental to her health.  It would seem 
that this is an example of how consideration of the overall environment can be harmful 
in the determination of health.  This illuminates the problem with inclusion of all 
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environmental factors in a descriptivist theory - as an external observer, all one can do 
is consider this woman’s ability to function in her environment - she either is able or 
she is not.  Even as a physician, observation of this woman wouldn’t enable one to say 
she is not in a state of health.  The first woman was clearly not in a state of health 
because she was losing her job - it’s clear that she was not properly functioning in her 
environment.  But assuming that this woman is able to perform all of the tasks that she 
normally performs, despite being in a brutally abusive relationship, she is functioning 
perfectly well in the world, and hence, is in a state of health. 
 The above situation seems inherently problematic, and it is likely for two 
reasons.  The first is that our evaluation of the above scenario is still descriptive - she 
either is or is not able to function in her environment.  But this is not really the case in 
terms of functioning in the world.  Functionality is not really a descriptivist notion - it is 
more of a normative one.  We say that a person is functioning well or not functioning 
well.  It is not a matter of true or false, it is a matter of evaluation - the question is not if 
a person is functioning, it is how well is a person functioning in their environment.  So 
with the introduction of the environment, we also must introduce normativism.  
 The second reason the situation seems problematic is that we are not 
considering the question of the will.  Does the second woman want to be in the position 
she is in?  Is she there by force, or does she opt to stay?  When discussing worldliness, 
the specific questions of the will seem to be of paramount importance.  Regardless of 
the way the environment interacts with the subject, what ultimately matters for health 
in the worldly relationship is the subject’s attitude towards their situation.  The ability 
for one to function in the world cannot be something that is examined from the outside, 
even if worldliness is taken into account.  What matters most about the practical reality 
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of health is that it belongs to an individual.  Although an individual’s environment in 
the world certainly influences his or her health, their subjective judgments and 
understandings are ultimately what will dictate the state of health. 
 
Health as the state in which one is able to achieve vital goals in life 
 
 Upon introduction of the environment, the notion of health loses most, if not all, 
of its objective qualities, and becomes normative and evaluative - the prior definition 
ceases to work, and a level of positivity or negativity must be assigned to a person’s 
level of functioning in their environment.  Hence, there must be some evaluation of a 
person’s functionality in the world - the idea must change from ‘health is a state in 
which a person is able to function in the world’ to ‘health is a state in which a person is 
able to function well in the world.’  From a theoretical standpoint, an evaluation of how 
well or not well a person is functioning in their environment would be done by society 
in a type of cultural process (Kovacs).  The process of evaluation could never be viewed 
as objective in any sense, which is not a problem in itself.  But a problem does arise 
when one considers that an individual’s views may not match the views of their society 
or culture.  To use the previous definition, if it is generally held by Country X’s culture 
that the proper function of a woman in society is to be completely subordinate to her 
husband regardless of any violence or harm that he may cause her, and to do the duties 
that he commands her to do, then even if this woman was completely miserable, and in 
a state of suffering, the society of Country X would consider her to be doing quite well 
in terms of her function in the world, and hence, she would be in a state of health 
regardless of her will. 
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But if we have accepted the fact health is a matter of subjective evaluation, then 
it does not seem just for anyone but the individual subject who’s health is being 
considered to evaluate their own state in the world.  That is, if the wills of other 
subjects are being considered in order to determine general rules for the basis of health, 
it only makes sense for the individual subject in question to make the final decision on 
whether or not they are in a good state.  To refer to the clinical setting, it seems clear 
that the patient’s own understanding of their condition is more important than their 
societies understanding of a condition. The environment or society may very well 
influence the evaluation in some way, but ultimately, the will of that individual is 
paramount. 
 Nordenfeldt acknowledges this reality about the will of the individual in his 
conception of health, introducing the notion of goal achievement.  In his theory, 
Nordenfeldt goes beyond the idea that health is a person’s ability to function well, 
asserting that health is a state in which an individual can function well according to his 
own will.  To use his words, “P is healthy, if and only if, given standard circumstances, 
P has the ability to realize his or her vital goals.  P’s vital goals constitute the set of 
those states of affairs which are necessary and together sufficient for P’s minimal 
happiness” (Nordenfeldt, 1993, p. 8).  Interestingly and controversially, Nordenfeldt 
bases his theory of health upon happiness, and not just a biological end like survival or 
reproduction.  With this understanding of the idea alone, there are two apparent 
problems with Nordenfeldt’s theory that pertain to this discussion, both pointed out by 
Schramme (2007).   
The first objection raised by Schramme is that the theory includes far too much 
exclusion criteria by associating health directly with happiness.  Schramme asserts that 
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there must be a more solidified scientific basis for what situations count as illness and 
which situations are just examples of failure or unhappiness.  To illustrate this, he gives 
the example of an athlete, Lily, who cannot meet her goal of jumping two meters - an 
ambition she has had all her life.  Lily has no biological abnormalities or diseases, but 
she cannot achieve this goal, no matter how hard she tries.  Schramme claims that 
under Nordenfeldt’s definition, Lily would be considered ill, despite the fact that she is 
clearly healthy, emphasizing a major inadequacy in Nordenfeldt’s definition.   
In response, Nordenfeldt first stresses the fact that health is not a descriptive 
concept - that there is a range of health from very high to very low, but he 
acknowledges the fact that Schramme would probably refuse to accept that her health 
is lowered in any way, and moves on to his next point.  Nordenfeldt stresses the fact 
that a person’s goals are a reflection of mental health - that if this athlete cannot 
achieve even minimal happiness without jumping two meters, that she certainly is not 
in a state of health.  Hence, in this circumstance, the care would not be provided by a 
surgeon.  Rather, it would be provided by a psychiatrist who would help her reassess 
her vital goals in life. 
The second issue that Schramme raises is that Nordenfeldt’s theory is entirely 
dictated by a subject’s sensation and experience - he raises the question of dormant 
diseases that are asymptomatic.  That is, he asks how, given Nordenfeldt’s theory, a 
person could be considered medically abnormal (not in a state of health) if they do not 
feel badly.  In reply, Nordenfeldt explains his analysis of the concept of disease - that a 
disease is a bodily or mental process that has, in past cases, produced suffering in some 
way (2007).  Though not explicit in his reply to Schramme, I think Nordenfeldt’s point 
is one we realized near the outset of this discussion - that a person can be both in a 
	   
29 
state of health and in a state of disease - that these two concepts are not antonymous to 
one another.  A person with dormant cancer, for instance, may have a disease, but also 
be in a state of health. 
I find Nordenfeldt’s formulation to be a very satisfying way of defining health in 
terms of a person’s subjective understanding of their ability to interact with the world.  
However, as noted by George Khushf in his article, “An Agenda for Future Debate 
Regarding Health and Disease,” Nordenfeldt seems to push a bit too far into the realm 
of the practical, without considering the theoretical notions upon which his ideas are 
built.  That is, Nordenfeldt’s definition of health establishes a teleological goal that 
medicine can strive towards, in a real and practical way, but it does not seem to be clear 
what the philosophical backing is behind this issue.  
Clearly, according to our originally stated goal in this section, Nordenfeldt’s 
definition seems to achieve the precise goal of the whole discussion.  However, now that 
a holistic, practical medical telos has been realized (or seems to have been realized), it 
is necessary to examine what is going on behind these assertions.  That is, we must 
engage in a deeper philosophical examination of the basis behind the movement we 
have just experienced.  To clarify, Nordenfeldt’s notion does seem useful, but in order 
to fully understand this practical idea, we must look deeper at the movement that 









Section 2: Being as the Basis for Health 
In the previous section, we have come to one clear realization, if none other: that 
the notion of health is exceedingly complicated and controversial.  Clearly, there are a 
multitude of ways to define health, with different nuances and specificities.  It seems 
that there has to be some underlying philosophical issue behind all of the debate – one 
that will help further illuminate what the true goal of the physician is.  Although 
Nordenfeldt’s definition does seem somewhat practically satisfying, one cannot help 
but inquire into the philosophical underpinnings of the entire debate.  It seems that 
there is something lurking throughout the discussion, some reason that the debate even 
exists.  It is the goal of this section to examine the previous movement, with hopes that 
a basis may be found for the confusion about health.  Furthermore, from that basis, I 
hope to arrive at a philosophically sound way of thinking about health, and a clear telos 
for the project of medicine. 
Thus, in this section, three major points will ultimately be realized.  The first is 
that discussions of health must be understood as inherently human.  The second is the 
fact that health is a human construct, and that this construct is based on a subjective 
notion of being, which is why the task of defining health has become so difficult.  The 
third is that in western society, our notion of being is completely fragmented, and this 
leads to a massive amount of confusion about health and medicine4.  Through the 
discussion of these issues, a useful theoretical notion behind the project of the 
physician will come to light. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 This notion is somewhat similar to Gadamer’s discussion of health in The Enigma of 
Health, The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age. 
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The humanity of medicine 
 
It seems that the most blatant realization made in the previous section is that 
any discussion of health in medicine must acknowledge the fact that it is addressing an 
issue that is inherently and intimately human in nature.  Throughout the discussion, 
there is not only a movement from the philosophically descriptive to the 
philosophically normative – there is also a clear movement from the discussion of an 
object to the discussion of a subject.  As the definition of health widens, what seems to 
be occurring is an incorporation of the things that make humans different than other 
organisms.  A seemingly obvious fact starts to come to light – it seems that human 
health is completely different than any other kind of health, and it must be treated as 
such. 
 In the earlier definitions, the human is treated as a body that is subject to 
external imposition, a thing that can be statistically evaluated for normality from an 
external and objective perspective.  This way of thinking about health may be useful in 
the examination of a plant, or even of an animal.  But what seemed to be continually 
overlooked was that the entire notion of health – of normal functioning, of statistical 
norms of a lack of some pathogen – is an idea that is created by our own understanding 
of what it is to be. 
 We are tied up in a method of thinking by which we assume that we are 
functioning in a single metaphysical paradigm – the common assumption about the 
concept of human health is that it’s generated by the way the natural world functions.  
The early concepts discuss the functioning of biological systems as if they are inherent 
to our own notion of what it is to be in a positive state.  The descriptivist notions make 
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a blatant assumption that humans are simply organisms – that scientific observation 
and theories about the biosphere can be turned and applied to us, since we are 
biologically and physiologically similar to the rest of the living world. 
 
Health as a human construct and a derivative of being 
 
 What these descriptivist theories are fundamentally misunderstanding is that 
the notion of health is one that can only exist if humanity exists.   Health is not a 
concept that is derived from the observation of the way the external world functions – 
rather, it is the opposite.  In reality, health is an externalization of our own 
understanding of being – it is a concept that we selfishly throw upon the world, due to 
the way we inherently think.  It is clear that each specific notion of health is seeking to 
explain, in clear and objective terms, a single phenomenon – what it means to be a 
certain way: 
 -The ‘lack of disease’ theory strives to make the claim that a human is being well 
when they do not have a clear-cut malady that has been previously perceived in a 
negative way.   
-Similarly, the ‘functioning in the world’ theory asserts that the human is being 
well when it can perform tasks that will result in its physical survival and longevity 
within its society.   
-The statistical model is somewhat different, as it makes a strong attempt to 
remove the notion of health from any sort of normative notion at all – claiming that 
health simply describes normality.  But I think its quite clear that this is really an 
attempt to describe some larger phenomenon in clearer and more precise terms – it is 
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an attempt to solidify both the ‘normal functioning’ and the ‘lack of disease’ models in 
clear, mathematical terms.  For if health were nothing more than normality, the word 
‘health’ and the notion of ‘normal’ would be no different than one another – what it is 
trying to do is explain the concept of the ‘normal’ as it relates to being5. 
-Nordenfeldt’s notion of health can easily be seen as addressing the issue of 
being.  By discussing ‘vital goals,’ Nordenfeldt is making a practical assertion (possibly 
too practical) about our deeper philosophical notions of what it means to be. 
 In recognizing that the notion of being is at the center of all attempts to define 
health, it becomes quite clear that the entire notion of health is a construct of the 
human – it is a way of describing what it is to be well.  This is, quite literally, the 
definition of health – ‘holistic health’ is often used as a synonym of the term ‘well 
being.’  When we define any other thing in the world as ‘healthy,’ we are making an 
assertion that is based on our own understanding of what it is to be.  In saying that a 
tree is healthy, we are making a judgment about the being of that tree – we are 
imposing a definition of the tree’s being, and then judging the tree based upon that 
definition.  In other words, our assertion that the tree is healthy rests upon our own 
assertion that it is good for trees to continue to grow, sprout leaves, produce seeds, etc.  
We assume that this is a fundamental fact about the tree – but in reality, this is not 
necessarily the case.  We have no idea what a tree is supposed to do – what a tree is 
supposed to be like.  The only thing that we can do is make a judgment about how it is 
supposed to be.  Hence, when we say it is healthy, we are making an unwarranted 
assumption about the tree.  We assume that trees are supposed to grow and age 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 The term ‘being’ here is not supposed to refer exclusively to any specific philosophical 
interpretation of it – it is intentionally left ontologically open.  
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because that is how we perceive our own being.  And to apply that to the realm of all 
living organisms, our assertion that ‘well functioning’ is a state in which an organism is 
able to reproduce and thrive is equally unwarranted. 
 
The fragmented western conception of being 
 
The fact that health is a human construct wouldn’t be at all problematic in 
medicine, if we had any clear notion of what it meant to be. But in modern western 
culture, we have an extremely complicated and confused idea.  The purpose of our lives 
is not as clear-cut and teleological as it was in other time periods or in other parts of the 
world.  In ancient Greece, for example, the notion of being was entirely holistic – the 
project of medicine was explicitly understood in terms of a ‘harmony’ between soul and 
body.  In the Phaedrus, Plato writes, “medicine has to define the nature of the body and 
the rhetoric of the soul” (p. 9).   And even in other parts of the world in modern times, 
being is understood entirely holistically.  The Kogi people of Colombia, for example, 
conceptualize being as ‘one with the entirety of the universe’ – all ailments are 
understood as imbalance, or as having occurred due to deviation from the natural 
moral order (Riechel-Dolmatoff).   
The problem, or condition, that currently exists in our world is due to the fact 
that the natural scientific paradigm has become overwhelmingly widely accepted over 
the course of the last century.  Hence, our notion of what it is to be has become tied up, 
almost exclusively, in a biological or scientific notion, rather than any other 
philosophical one.  In defining being in terms of science, we have put ourselves – the 
subjective selves – on the level of all other life forms.  In one sense, being has become 
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nothing more than biological actualization, but at the same time, it still seems that 
there is so much more to it.  This is why it is so difficult to define health in western 
culture – our world involves an inherent contradiction.  Biology considers us a part of 
the animal kingdom, and yet, we still strive to separate ourselves as a single, unique 
entity that exists at a higher level than the rest of our animal peers.  Our conception of 
what it means to be has been brutally fragmented by the developments in natural 
science, and we are having an extremely hard time putting the pieces back together.    
It seems that there are three major positions that can be taken in the western 
world when it comes to being, and each of these paradigms would have a different 
understanding of the doctor and of medicine.  These ideologies can be understood as 
positions on a spectrum6: 
On one end of the spectrum is the hard scientist, who genuinely believes that the 
being of a human can be entirely understood and explained by mathematics and 
science.  These people truly believe that the human is an animal – that the only thing 
separating us from the rest of the animal kingdom is evolutionary advancement.  As far 
as health goes, they are likely to side with the biological functionalist – claiming that 
health is a state in which an organism can thrive in the physical environment in a way 
that is no different than an amoeba. Hence, they would probably claim that the doctor 
is just a bio-physiological specialist of the human body.   In terms of the project of 
medicine, then, they would understand the doctor as nothing more than any other 
scientist.  They would see the project of medicine as having a clear teleological 
outcome, either adopting a Boorsian, statistical understanding of what it means to be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 The ‘ends of the spectrum’ serve as archetypal – I am not making the claim that there 
are a large number of people who actually take these positions.  Rather, I am using the 
positions as a way of illuminating the ideologies towards which people may tend. 
	   
36 
healthy, or a biologically functional understanding. 
On the other end of the spectrum is the person who denies that science has a 
major impact on what it means to be, and asserts that being is something much greater 
than scientific understanding.  These people would reject the notion that science holds 
any primacy – and claim that assertions of the natural sciences are only grounded and 
important insofar as they influence some other worldview.  Most of the western people 
of this group would be very religious.  There’s no doubt that there are other groups in 
the world that recognize some aspects of science, but see it as a secondary explanation 
of being.  But in the western world, most of these groups would be religious groups with 
a clear understanding of what it is to be in the world – and hence, their notion of health 
would be quite clear.  They would understand the physician as a person who could help 
them fix some parts of their being, but not all – the truly religious Christian, for 
example, would likely understand biological problems as fairly minute in the greater 
scheme of being.  Nevertheless, this type of person would have a clear idea of what they 
wanted out of the project of medicine, based upon their clear understanding of being, 
whatever that may be. 
If everyone embodied one of these two extreme archetypes, there wouldn’t be 
much difficulty in defining the project of medicine.  Both parties would come to the 
doctor with a clear understanding of what they expected.  But of course, these 
archetypes are unrealistic.  What is more common is the middle position – the position 
that most people occupy in the western world.  These people would have a fragmented, 
unclear understanding of being, accepting most or all scientific assertions, but still 
retaining some assertion that there’s ‘something more’ to being human.  This group 
likely asserts that biological health – keeping their bodies well – is an integral part of 
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being as a whole, but that being involves more than this.  The problem with this 
position is that they would not know how to reconcile, or explain, their dual view.  It 
would be extremely difficult for these people to understand what they wanted out of 
medicine – if one doesn’t understand their own being, then how can the doctor make it 
well?   
 This exhibits the challenge of the western doctor – he must reconcile a notion of 
being that has been shattered over the course of the last two centuries.  He must 
navigate the intricate and nuanced interplay between unclear notions of what it is to be 
healthy.  In doing so, he must treat the patient biologically, but also take into account 
the patient’s personal understanding of what it is to be well in the world.  This task is 
much more difficult than the task of another type of doctor – a shaman, for instance.  
The shaman has a clear idea of what it is to be healthy, and how the world works.  His 
patients believe in him and his methods, his explanations are clear and encompass the 
patients whole being.  When confronted with the ultimate challenge in medicine – the 
possibility on non-being, or death, the shaman can come up with clear answers, 
explanations, and decisions, since the paradigm of the shaman and his patient is whole 
and clear. 
 But when the western doctor is confronted with situations that involve death, or 
any major decision for that matter, a blatant mystery arises.  Without a clear 
understanding of what it is to be, it is extremely difficult to make decisions that involve 
the possibility of non-being – it is difficult to make decisions at all, for that matter.  
Since being is so loosely defined, health is equally loosely defined – and it is open to 
each patient’s interpretation.  The major problem with this is that most patients – and 
many doctors – don’t even realize that this is happening.  The western patient believes 
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on a conscious level that he is only going to the doctor to fix his biological condition – 
but he still expects to be treated like a human.  People tend to like doctors who are kind 
and warm, who treat them with compassion and empathy, who guide them through the 
process of treatment while taking into account all of the things that affect their lives.  
Although much of what the western doctor seeks to achieve is biological in nature, the 
overall notion of health must encompass more than just the body – it must address the 
hidden side of the patient’s perceived notion of being, the other parts of this confused 
paradigm of the world. 
 
The theoretical notion behind the physician’s project 
 
It seems that Nordenfeldt comes close to realizing the scope of what health really 
is, but pushes too far into the pragmatic with the idea of goal achievement. Nordenfeldt 
seems to have recognized the fact that health is really just well being, but his 
explanation of that concept is too practically oriented.  In using the term ‘achieving 
vital life goals,’ Nordenfeldt really makes the suggestion that a person is healthy when 
they can go on living according to whatever they think living is supposed to look like – 
according to their own understanding of being.  The narrowness and overly practical 
nature of his theory to criticisms such as the ‘inadequate athlete’ example – a 
measurement of how badly one wants to achieve a certain specific goal in the world 
should not yield a definition of health.  Rather, an overall goal of life, which is derived 
by one’s personal understanding of being, should yield a notion of health. 
Clearly, when analyzing a person’s health, there is much more than just a goal 
that must be understood and analyzed.  But nonetheless, in western medicine, the 
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biological state of the patient is key to the patient’s health, due to our complicated 
paradigm.  So how is the doctor to understand the reconciliation of the two?  How is it 
that the western doctor is to understand the complex interplay between overall well 
being and the biological, or scientific, side of being? 
In order to answer these questions, let us revert to the original assertion about 
what happened to being upon the introduction of science to our world.  I think it’s 
important to understand that the common notion of being was not split after the 
introduction of natural science – rather, it was fragmented.  This is why our common 
understanding of being is so complex – it is not the case that there are two notions of it, 
or even three.  Rather, there are a plethora of different instances of beings.   
And because we defined health as a positive state of overall being, we must also 
understand health in terms of this fragmentation.  What seems to have happened, then, 
is that we went from an overall understanding of Health, as a unified idea of being well, 
to specific instances of health, or the specific ways in which we can be well.  Health, as a 
unified concept, turned into the set of all ‘healths,’ as it were.  Now, we use terms like 
‘spiritual health,’ ‘emotional health,’ ‘mental health,’ etc.  All of these constitute the 
fragmented parts of our overall notion of what makes up the holistic notion of Health, 
or overall well being. 
With this conceptualization, the role of the physician becomes a lot more 
accessible, as do the previous assertions about health.  The differences in a lot of the 
definitions constitute which ‘healths’ the doctor is supposed to address, and which he is 
not.  I don’t think that anyone would argue that emotional health does not exist – but I 
do think some thinkers would argue that it is not the role of the physician to address 
this component of overall Health.  What does seem to be universally agreed upon is 
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that biological health is very important to the project of medicine.  Every one of the 
definitions that we discussed in the previous section addressed medical health as 
biological in some way.  What changed was how the health was treated, or understood, 
beyond the biological context. 
I think this is the key to understanding the project of the western doctor, as well 
as the notion of health.  It seems that it is the goal of any doctor, regardless of culture 
or time period, to move his patient towards a notion of Health in some way.  Over time 
and throughout the world, some kinds of doctors may specialize, or may have 
specialized, in different kinds of health (or, in other cases, they may have been able to 
address Health as a whole), but all of these doctors have certainly been trying to bring 
their patients towards overall Health. Even within our own culture, we can see other 
health-specialists, such as marriage counselors, who seek to bring a person towards 
overall Health by improving the health of their relationship.  The western medical 
doctor, then, is to be seen as the ‘biological health specialist.’ 
But if this were the simple goal of the physician, it seems that we could have 
stopped the discussion a long time ago.  This idea of a ‘human technician’ seems to be 
what we have been moving away from – the previous movements have been towards a 
humanization of medicine, not a re-emphasis on the biological. 
But what has been realized is that the doctor must move towards biological 
health only insofar as it improves a person’s overall Health.  That is, it is absolutely 
imperative to recognize the limits of the scope of western medicine, and the way it is 
supposed to fit into a person’s attempt to establish Health.  As previously noted, each 
individual patient will have a totally different way of reconciling the two concepts – 
biological health and Health as a whole.  Some people will value their own biological 
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health more than others.  Clearly, there is a subjective, individualistic element to the 
relationship between Health and biological health – and the physician must recognize 
this in order to accomplish the overall goal of establishing Health. 
This leads to a quite clear and satisfying answer to our original question.  The 
role of the physician is to be conceptualized as twofold.  On one hand, the physician 
must come to understand the complicated interplay between biological health and 
overall Health in each one of his patients, in order to understand how decisions are to 
be made in each specific medical context.  He must recognize and respect each 
subjective understanding of what it means to be, and be in Health, and base his 
decisions upon the patient’s notion, and not his own.  On the other hand, he must 
actually improve upon the biological health of the patient, carrying out what we 
consider ‘medical procedures’.  Furthermore, although it is the doctor’s specific goal to 
establish biological health, it is not to be forgotten that it is his overall project to 
establish complete Health.  Hence, he is to do whatever he feels is within his power to 
accomplish this.  The doctor is to realize and remember the limitations of his training 
and not the limitations of his project.  Therefore, if a patient complains of issues that 
seem non-biological, but still effect Health, he is to do everything in his power to 
address those issues – likely referring the patient, caringly, to another specialist. 
Before moving on, let us first address an issue that may arise at first glance – it 
seems that making a claim about ‘biological health’ re-raises the problem that was 
being worked through in the previous section, sending us back to square one, with 
different terminology – ‘biological health’ is still undefined.  However, if we look at the 
context in which the term is used, it is not at all problematic.  That is, the term is simply 
used as a vague notion of things that are generally considered to affect a person’s 
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experience of the world from a biological perspective.  In other words, biological issues 
are the ones the western medical doctor is trained to deal with.   
We do not  need specific inclusion or exclusion criteria for two reasons.  The first 
reason is that we have clearly stated that the overall project of the physician is to 
establish holistic Health in the patient, although he is a biological health specialist.  
With this understanding, a physician could never make the claim that a certain 
borderline-biological issue is ‘outside of his jurisdiction.’  The physician must do 
everything in his power to address any issue that may be considered biological.  His 
training is what will dictate what he can address.  Furthermore, the second reason the 
lack of a clear definition will not be a problem is that the patient’s subjective 
understanding of holistic Health is what is used to make decisions about medicine.  
This eliminates the doctor’s ability to force a procedure upon a patient in the name of 
health.  All decisions will be an agreement between physician and patient7. 
So to clarify, the two major aspects of the physician’s role are 1) to come to a 
specific understanding of the way each patient conceptualizes the interplay between 
biological health and overall Health (or in other words, attempt to understand the 
patient’s overall conception of being), and 2) to improve upon the biological health of 
their patient.  In addition, the physician is to remember that his ultimate goal is to 
establish overall Health, and he is to do whatever he can to accomplish that goal.  The 
question that now needs to be asked is: how, exactly, is the western doctor supposed to 
achieve this goal?   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 It is recognized here that this may cause a dilemma in certain circumstances, in which 
the individual cannot make decisions for him/her self (ie. infants, the mentally insane, 
the unconscious).  This certainly needs to be addressed, but it does not fall within our 
scope.  The inquiry here seeks to address the common, every day clinical interaction. 
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Part II: Actualizing the Goal of the Physician 
 
Section 3: The Major Paradigms of Medicine 
In light of the holistic, philosophically grounded notion of the project of the 
physician, we can now begin to look into the way by which the physician is to achieve 
his goal.  In order to do so, it seems natural to start with a discussion of the two major 
‘paradigms of medicine’ – patient centered medicine (PCM) and evidence-based 
medicine (EBM).  The two approaches will be explicated and explored in light of the 
overall philosophical goal of the physician in order to determine which of the two, if 
either, is a more effective route to accomplishing the overall project of the physician. 
In light of our twofold goal of the physician, the hope is that we will be able to 
come to find a way these two paradigms accomplish each of the two goals – both the 
goal of establishing the patient’s understanding of the relationship between biological 
health and holistic Health, and the goal of improving upon the notion of biological 
health.  Simply based off of the names, it seems that EBM may accomplish the first, 
while PCM may accomplish the second – but that is left to be explored. 
 
Evidence Based Medicine 
  
 Evidence based medicine is, in short, the process of gathering, appraising, and 
utilizing relevant research findings in order to make decisions in the clinical setting.  It 
is based nearly exclusively upon a set of quantified data, and seeks to avoid the 
‘subjective’ influence of the clinician in order to base decisions and actions in fact.  
	   
44 
From a practical perspective, EBM is based on four separate, yet equally important, 
elements or steps8.  These steps are used to ensure that the best medical treatment is 
being used in any given scenario.  The first step to EBM is the formulation of a question 
according to the patient’s condition.  This step involves a clarification and 
quantification, to some extent, of the symptoms and signs.  It is noted that they should 
be as specific as possible, include a specific ‘type’ of patient (a classification according 
to different characteristics), as well as a style of clinical intervention and the ‘clinical 
outcome of interest.’  In their article ‘Evidence based medicine: an approach to problem 
solving,’ Rosenberg and Donald use the following example of an appropriate question 
in two parts: “How great is the annual risk of embolic stroke in a 77 year old woman 
with non-rheumatic atrial fibrillation, hypertension, and moderate left ventricular 
enlargement if she is not given anticoagulants?” (p. 1123) and “What is the risk of 
reduction for stroke from warfarin therapy in such a patient, and what is the risk of 
harming her with this therapy?” (p.1123).  
 Once the question is formed, the clinician must find the best available evidence, 
based on what is available in literature databases.  Large online data sets have been in 
the process of assembly over the last several years, and are constantly being updated.  
With some fairly elementary search skills, a clinician can find meta-analyses and other 
articles that address prognosis and treatment of the condition, with reported data of 
outcomes.  With proper search technique in the right database, a large array of 
information should be available. 
 Following the gathering of data, the clinician must appraise the evidence.  This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This explanation of the steps of EBM is based largely upon the article ‘Evidence based 
medicine: an approach to clinical problem solving’ by Rosenberg and Donald – they 
give a clear and concise explanation of how, exactly, EBM works. 
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part is slightly more complicated – it involves the interpretation of clinical studies with 
regard to the specific patient.  In this step, the clinician decides whether or not an 
article is useful in terms of guiding the treatment.  Although some clinicians are not 
formally trained in research methodology and analysis, a method called ‘clinical 
appraisal’ has become popular, in which a team of trained scientists answer a series of 
standardized questions about published articles, and offer this appraisal along with the 
research findings.  This almost serves as an instructions manual for the research. 
 After the research has been appraised and it has been deemed that the article 
will be relevant to the current state of the patient, the evidence must be acted upon.  In 
this stage, the clinician must isolate the useful components of the evidence that directly 
relate to their own patient, and apply those same methods on the patient in hope that it 
will have a similarly beneficial outcome. 
In terms of our overall notion of the project of medicine, EBM seems to deal 
exclusively with biological health.  There does not seem to be explicit ‘room,’ so to 
speak, for the doctor to attempt to understand the patient’s personal understanding of 
being.  That is, it seems that EBM only addresses one of the two major roles of the 
overall project – the establishing and improving upon biological health.  There is a 
rather clear conceptual framework for this medical paradigm, and there is never any 
explicit mention of the patient’s subjective influence.  This is likely a major reason why 
so many modern thinkers are tending away from the model – it seems to view health as 
strictly biological. 
But with our clear understanding of the physician’s goal, this does not pose a 
problem.  It seems completely legitimate to consider the possibility that EBM, as a 
system of practicing medicine, could constitute one part of the overall medical 
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paradigm.  It could serve as the basis for the development of biological health, while 
some other ideology or system could serve as the basis for establishing an overall 
understanding of holistic Health in the patient.  That is, EBM could be the way by 
which physicians actualize a preconceived decision with regards to health.  The fact that 
these decisions need to be made through some other method does not pose much of a 
problem – another paradigm can be used to accomplish this task.  So as long as the 
doctor understands and accepts the limitations of EBM, and is not viewed as the only 
paradigm of medicine, it seems that it may be quite beneficial. 
 Furthermore, from a practical biological perspective, it is not hard to see why so 
many scientists appreciate and support EBM – it seems to generate clinical decisions 
with a very high level of factual backing, and it eliminates a good amount of uncertainty 
about those decisions.  However, even from a practical view, many other scientists and 
physicians see some major issues with the approach.  The main issues arise when one 
examines the process of data appraisal and evidence application – neither is as 
objective and factual as it originally seemed. 
 The general explanation of EBM and how it works ignores some fundamental 
difficulties that arise in the practice, a major one being the process of appraising 
evidence.  Even if relevant data can be located on a given topic, the evaluation of the 
efficacy of that data in the treatment of a specific condition is never as clear-cut 
(Haynes et al.).  There are several guides available that inform clinicians of how to 
appraise data to determine its efficacy in different circumstances – guides that tell the 
clinician when or why to use specific treatments covered in articles.  Essentially, the 
primary research articles require a further level of review before they become effective 
in a lot of circumstances.  As mentioned before, the practice of ‘clinical appraisal’ has 
	   
47 
also become popular, in which another level of uncertainty is added to already 
uncertain data.  The existence of these ‘middle men’ in data interpretation and 
appraisal muddles the scientific rigor that may exist in the quantitative evidence.  
Essentially, the practice of interpreting a quantitative data set for its application to a 
qualitative, ever-changing scenario (as is the nature of the human body) is one that can 
never be completely uninfluenced by some subjective ideology, no matter how science-
based it may seem. 
 Furthermore, the complexity of a lot of therapeutic strategy is commonly 
overlooked, and this results in articles simply being appraised as relevant without 
further analysis into the nuances of the procedure.  That is, even if an article is 
appraised to be effective in a given circumstance, there are a plethora of nuanced 
elements of medical procedures that may be overlooked or understated, either from the 
perspective of the researcher or the practicing clinician (Naylor).  When clinical 
strategies are developed, there are usually several different technologies or techniques 
involved.  It is impossible to analyze each of these nuances individually – generally; 
articles just give an overview of a clinical strategy without explaining the specific type of 
technology, timing, sequence, etc.  In other words, there are a huge number of variables 
that cannot practically be controlled, especially when dealing with a human subject.  So 
even if an article is deemed as ‘effective’ for a certain situation, the actualization of that 
treatment may not be in accordance with the original study’s protocol, which may cause 
a different outcome.  
 Furthermore, the fact that a human being is the subject of the procedure makes 
scientific rigor very difficult to uphold.  There will not only be inevitable variables in the 
way in which the procedure is carried out – there are also inevitable variables within 
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the patient.  There is no way, even conceptually, to control every bodily system in a 
patient.  When an original clinical study is carried out, the investigators can only 
control for so much – age, gender, race and things of the like, along with certain 
exclusion criteria.  But those exclusion criteria are nothing more than an informed 
guess about what may or may not get in the way of the therapy they are testing.  A study 
may proclaim, for instance, that a certain procedure on the lung is successful as long as 
a patient does not have a certain type of heart condition.  But what if certain liver 
conditions also affect the efficacy of the procedure?  If none of the patients in the study 
had these liver conditions, the researchers would never know that there would be an 
affect on the lung procedure.  The point here is that the human body is extraordinarily 
complex – quantifying it in any way is a very daunting task. 
 Clearly, there are some major problems with EBM, even when viewed from a 
strictly scientific paradigm.  But nonetheless, it does seem to have the potential to 
become very effective if the level of scientific rigor in the medical community is 
increased.  If studies become clearer and protocols more exact, it should become the 
ultimate way to practice biological medicine.  But is this really so?  The soundness of 
the philosophical basis for the model is still left to be explored. 
 The notion of ‘evidence’ is one that has been somewhat unclear in the 
philosophy of science during the twentieth century.  In her article “On evidence and 
evidence-based medicine: Lessons from the philosophy of science,” Maya Goldenberg 
argues that the notion of evidence as ‘fact’ is an antiquated belief of the positivist 
empiricist, and that this misunderstanding stands at the root of the inefficacy of EBM.  
It does not occur to many people to question this issue – it seems, especially in modern 
western culture – that a stronger correlation to ‘the evidence’ yields increasing 
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certainty.  In an age in which paradigmatic notions of the world are so unclear and 
different, adhering to ‘evidence’ seems to serve as a universal notion that clarifies 
between the correct and the incorrect with regard to all claims – referring to evidence 
seems to be the way in which the scientific paradigm has come to permeate all aspects 
of life.  It seems, at least in the scientific community, that evidence serves as a god in a 
godless world – it judges, it controls, it can be found in and through all things.  In the 
process of scientific inquiry, evidence is the judge of the good and the bad, the fact and 
the rubbish.  But is evidence really this all-powerful entity that it seems to be? 
 There are two major objections to the idea that evidence is effective as the basis 
of scientific methodology.  The first claim, held by both Kuhn and by Hanson, involves 
the assertion that all observations, especially those made in a scientific context, are 
inherently connected to an already-existing theory.  It seems that much of the 
empiricist epistemology of the early modern to modern era assumes that there is a 
stable and unchanging relation between the external world and the perceiving subject.  
Thinkers like Hume have made the assertion that the simple ideas that we hold in our 
minds are ‘copies’ of the real things in the world – that they are accurate and clear 
representations of them.  But when we introduce the concept of naming, or language, it 
becomes more difficult to clarify what the implications of this are.  Wittgenstein’s duck-
rabbit serves as a useful example.  Even if we see the image of the creature, and our 
idea of that the creature really is a ‘copy’ of it, the way we name it, or conceptualize it, is 
going to be muddled by something else – whether that is our own mind or some other 
influence from the external world is not important.  The point is that the route from an 
image in the world to our verbal assertion about that image is not clear and direct.  
There is plenty of room for error or some kind of influence – it doesn’t matter if one 
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deems this subjective interpretation or something else.  The point is clearly illustrated 
by the duck-rabbit – one person might call it a duck, another will call it a rabbit.  
Hence, two different observers may describe even a simple piece of evidence 
differently. 
 And furthermore, scientific data interpretation is obviously never as simple as 
naming a duck or a rabbit.  The impressions (to use Hume’s terminology) that are 
received in scientific inquiry are extremely complex – even Hume would agree that they 
require a massive degree of mental synthesis, on behalf of the imagination, before one 
could actually say anything about the impression.  Obviously, this is a major problem 
when it comes to a researcher’s assertion about evidence – using scientific terminology, 
the relationship between quantitative data and an actual assertion about evidence is a 
very complex one.  The arguments made by Kuhn and Hanson assume that this is due 
to a theoretical backing in the observer – they argue that it is a difference in the 
perception of the subject.  Again using Wittgenstein’s image, a scientist who studies 
ducks will probably call the image a duck, while a scientist who studies rabbits will 
deem it a rabbit.  But regardless of the philosophical question about the root of the 
distinction between the asserted ideas/evidence, there is no doubt that some confusion 
exists. 
 The second major objection against evidence as the unquestionable root of 
science is an elaboration on the previous idea, in a way.  Both Duhem and Quine make 
the claim that the connection between data and theory is always somehow interrupted 
by an unwarranted subjective influence.  That is, theory is not only derived directly 
from data. It points to the fact that a single body of evidence can be used to suggest 
multiple different scientific theories, depending on how it is interpreted by the 
	   
51 
researcher.  It is noted that often times, scientists are left in a position where they have 
to adopt one theory over another – this actually happens quite often in science.  The 
mere fact that one theory can be ‘believed’ by a scientist completely destroys the idea 
that scientific theories can be utilized as factual.  The adoption of any theory, especially 
theories of medicine, is always predetermined by subjective biases.  Hence, all scientific 
studies involve subjective choices on behalf of the researchers.  In the process of 
interpreting the data, the investigator must make subjective judgments about the data 
in order to turn it into evidence – no theory is solely based upon the external world. 
 To put succinctly, the first plight raises an issue with the connection between 
phenomena in the world and our assertions about what those phenomena are.  That is, 
it raises an issue with the derivation of evidence from observation.  The second plight 
raises a further issue, claiming that theories are almost never sufficiently determined 
by data, and that the decision to adopt one theory over another is usually a matter of 
subjective choice.  These two major issues exhibit the philosophical basis for the 
previously discussed practical problems in EBM.  It seemed at the outset that the 
problem with evidence appraisal, application of theory and the complexity of the 
human subject were problems that arose due to a lack of scientific rigor – that they 
could be eliminated with stricter protocols and better methodology.  But as it turns out, 
there are inherent philosophical problems at their root.  It seems that the 
conceptualization of evidence as a representation of factual reality is misleading for 
several reasons – the entire concept of basing medical practice solely on evidence is 
flawed from the outset.  But if we cannot use science alone to solve a scientific problem, 
then what is to be done? 
 To recap, it was established that EBM is the type of medicine that is to be used to 
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solve entirely biological problems – the type of medicine that increases the 
functionality of the body alone, without treating the subject as whole.  As stated, it 
would seem that adhering to evidential findings would be the best approach to 
addressing these types of issues.  All other fields of science seem to use quantitative 
research and statistical data analysis to derive evidence that will then be used to carry 
on with a theory.  But there is a fundamental difference between medical science and all 
other types of science – in medical science, the end result is the sustenance of a human 
life.  The stakes are much higher in medicine.   
To use an example, if a pharmaceutical company is investigating the efficacy of 
an antibiotic for deadly bacteria, and their studies show that 90% of bacteria die when 
treated with this agent, the drug is deemed effective.  The 10% that lived are simply 
deemed as outliers, and are never analyzed specifically.  When that drug goes into 
practice, if 90% of the people treated are cured, it is similarly considered successful in 
the scientific community.  But those 10% of people who were not cured cannot be 
pushed aside as outliers like in the case of the bacteria.  It is not only morally corrupt, 
but impractical to quantify human life in the form of a statistic.  Those unsuccessful 
cases need to be examined thoroughly to investigate why and how the antibiotic didn’t 
work – what it was about their body, specifically, that disallowed the efficacy of the 
drug.  For unlike the bacteria, each of those unsuccessful patient cases is just that – a 
case.  Each patient is viewed as an individual project, as a whole person, rather than an 
insignificant component of a study.  When a patient dies, there is a 100% failure – 
blaming ‘uncontrolled variables’ for that failure is not acceptable.  Those variables need 
to be explored and discovered in order for a study to be deemed effective. 
Clearly, the use of statistical data in medicine is far less useful than it would 
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seem.  Medicine requires much more than the application of faulty evidence proven by 
questionable studies.  The central problem with EBM is that it ignores the uniqueness 
of the medical situation and the specific patient, even on the bodily level.  Although 
evidence may be used as a guiding element in practice, the idea that protocols can be 
systematized and applied to people is impossible from a practical and philosophical 
perspective.  The answer to the problem, as I see it, lies in the recognition of the 
individual body and the individual care provider.  That is to say, the efficacy of 
medicine does not only lie in the systematic approach – it really lies more in the 
individual physician. 
This is clearly exhibited in the field of surgery.  In surgery, there are clear 
protocols, evidentially supported methods, and physical skills that require fine-tuning.  
A surgeon can be trained by the best educators and have impeccable skill with his 
hands, while following a strongly evidentially supported procedure, and still make a 
fatal mistake.  But how can this happen?  The answer, as I see it, lies in the ‘intangible’ 
element of medicine that is commonly overlooked due to its lack of scientific rigor – 
intuition. 
By intuition, I refer to the ability of an individual doctor to make decisions 
without synthesizing sequential and clearly stated reasons.  This may at first seem like 
the opposite of what a good doctor does, but I argue that the concept is rooted in two 
main things – the physician’s ability to think well, and the physician’s experience.  The 
ability to ‘think well’ is a term that I use instead of ‘decision making ability’ because I 
think that the concept should be understood in a broader sense.  What I mean by this is 
that the thought processes behind the actual moment at which the decision is made in 
the clinical setting should be acknowledged and emphasized.  That is, it is not only the 
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faculty of the mind that one would use in the event of a bleeding artery – the part of the 
mind that would be presented with options and choose one – that makes a doctor 
effective.  It is more than this – the effective physician has very good memory and 
forethought, among other things, so that each of his minute decisions can be precise 
and thought-out.  Furthermore, the effective physician will be able to focus on a task, 
while still considering the totality of his situation.  Hence, the mind must be strong in 
its totality in order to deal with the specific nuances that will inevitably arise. 
But in addition to a strong mind, the physician must also have extensive 
experience to draw upon.  Experience serves as the uncategorized knowledge base of 
the physician that will contribute to his overall intuition – although he may not be able 
to relate a decision to a specific study, the experienced physician will usually be able to 
explain another nuanced case he saw that he finds similar and relevant. Although any 
doctor can follow a large-scale procedure, only the one with a strong intuition will be 
able to tackle the specific, nuanced problems or challenges that inevitably arise in the 
practice of medicine.  The intuitive physician is the one who will know how to deal with 
an unusually formed physiological structure, or what to do when vitals change in 
certain strange situations. 
 It’s important to note here that the philosophical objections to evidence also 
apply to the experience of the doctor – all of his experiences are still subject to his own 
interpretation.  This is an inevitable fact in the world – all observations are subject to 
some interpretation.  However, what makes the use of ones own experience markedly 
different than the use of another’s is the fact that it’s consistent.  The central claim 
made by Hanson and Kuhn is that all perceptions are affected by preexisting beliefs in 
the subject, and hence, when a study is conducted and published, the way the scientist 
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subjectively interprets the data is always swayed by his prior experience.  The problem 
that then results is that other doctors make further assumptions about the study, and 
the way it was interpreted, and utilize it incorrectly – differently than the original 
investigator intended it to be used.  If the doctor relies most heavily upon his own 
direct experience, there will always be a level of consistency with which he views 
medical practice. 
 Similarly, if we emphasize the fact that the doctor is to rely more heavily upon 
his own experience, the second issue starts to disappear as well.  As long as the doctor 
understands that he inevitably has a tendency in his analysis of different published 
studies, he will not come to rely too heavily upon them – he will understand the fact 
that his own experience is paramount to the experiences described by others.  Hence, 
the benefit of the individual’s application of his own experience is that it eliminates a 
lot of steps in which the reality of the relevant experience can be lost.  That is, the steps 
involved in scientific procedure – or any conveyance of information, at that – are 
always vulnerable to a loss of reality.  Less subjective input will naturally yield a clearer 
idea. 
 Nonetheless, no doctor can ever encounter every problem in every situation – an 
evidence-backed basis for medicine does seem to be a useful piece to the overall 
approach to care, as long as the doctor understands the limitations of evidence, and the 
plethora of ways it can be obscured.  However, we must not forget how important the 
individual experience is – that in each specific case, it is the individual doctor who will 
be addressing the individual patient.  Hence, in the case of biological health, objectivity 
can only really be approached when the inherent subjectivity of the situation is 
embraced, rather than shunned.   
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Alone, EBM is clearly not a sufficient paradigmatic approach to address 
biological health.  Surprisingly, even in addressing the strictly bodily, biological side of 
health, it is still imperative to understand the individual body – and the individual 
doctor – as individual.  The influence of the subject, and the influence of individual, 
cannot be avoided in medicine.  
Before moving on, there are several conclusions that can be drawn from this 
discussion. The first is that EBM has weak/flawed philosophical backing – it is a 
systematic approach based on flawed steps.  The second realization is that the patient is 
an individual, and is unique in any and every circumstance.  The patient cannot be 
grouped with others or quantified if care is expected to be effective.  A third realization 
is that medicine cannot be systematized from the perspective of the provider – quality 
and efficacy of care is always inherently related to the individual doctor. 
So is everything about EBM complete nonsense?  I would say no.  The concept of 
evidence can be used as a basis for an approach to the achievement of biological health, 
but an overreliance or overconfidence in evidence is not only ineffective, but potentially 
harmful to the patient. Systematizing/quantifying care according to set protocols is 
based on an entirely flawed ideology.  To clarify, research can be used to point 
providers in the right direction, but it should never be used as the sole reason for a 
clinical decision.  While research does have the potential to suggest certain things about 
a procedure, those suggestions should not be directly applied to the decision making 
process.  Telling someone that ‘this is what we do in this situation.  Its protocol – it has 
the highest success rate of all available procedures’ is unacceptable and useless.     
I also think it’s important to note here that this is the part of medicine that rests 
entirely upon the doctor – the part of the project that is undertaken after other 
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philosophical decisions have been made about treatment.  This will be addressed in the 
future section on autonomy in the doctor/patient relationship – only the doctor should 
make decisions of this kind.  If a patient comes in and claims that they have ‘read about 
a procedure’ and that they want it done, they are basing their decision on an entirely 
flawed ideology.  The doctor is the sole person who can make the types of decisions that 
aim to achieve a predetermined goal, as he is the only one who has the relevant 
experience to do so.  
 
Patient Centered Medicine 
 
 In the previous discussion, one side of the project of medicine was explored – 
the attempt to improve upon biological health.  In the opening remarks, it was noted 
that this side of health seeks to actualize a predetermined goal – to achieve an outcome 
that has already been set.  In accordance with our understanding of the project of the 
physician, the determination of this outcome relates to the attempt to arrive at an 
understanding of the relationship between overall Health and biological health.  
Clearly, the EBM paradigm did not address this issue at all.  The hope, therefore, is that 
an exploration of this other major paradigm – PCM – will accomplish that goal.  It 
seems, according to the name, that patient centered medicine would explain the way in 
which the subjective patient is incorporated and focused upon in medical practice. 
 However, defining the term ‘patient centered medicine’ actually turns out to be 
an extremely difficult task – certainly more complicated and unclear than the defining 
of EBM.  In the literature about EBM, there is a clear, accurate and easily understood 
definition.  EBM truly is a way of practicing medicine in the western context, which 
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strives to accomplish a clear-cut biological outcome.  Although it is clearly flawed and 
incomplete as a whole approach to medicine, there is a clear and well-understood idea 
amongst doctors and philosophers of medicine alike of what it is, namely a strategic 
approach to improving upon a person’s biological state through certain means.   
 The literature on PCM is quite different than the literature on EBM – there is a 
significant amount of confusion regarding what the term actually refers to.  Almost all 
of the articles written on the subject define it in terms of what it is not, rather than what 
it is.  In most discussions, it is contrasted with disease-centered medicine or doctor-
centered medicine, but it is rarely fully explained in and of itself.  Jozien Bensing 
presents a clear example of this tendency in his article, “Bridging the gap. The separate 
worlds of evidence-based medicine and patient-centered medicine.”  In defining PCM, 
Bensing explicitly states that, “an illuminating way of [defining PCM] is by contrasting 
the concept with its opposite” (p. 21), and then goes on to state that it can be defined as 
the opposite of disease centered or the opposite of doctor centered.  Even most 
physicians adopt this method of defining PCM in terms of what it is not.  In his article 
in the New England Journal of Medicine, which is explicitly titled, “Defining ‘Patient-
Centered Medicine,’” Dr. Charles Bardes states that PCM strives to move away from the 
purely biotechnical medical model, and also strives to establish a more ’equal’ 
relationship between the doctor and the patient – but neither of these ideas are 
explicated.  Rather, they are simply stated.  Clearly, the general understanding of what 
PCM actually refers to is usually quite vague.   
  However, it was possible to find one article that gave a fairly substantial 
explanation of PCM, though I wouldn’t call it a definition.  Dr. Moira Stewart gives five 
criteria that describe the concept.  The claim is that PCM does the following: “a) 
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explores the patients’ main reason for the visit, concerns, and need for information; b) 
seeks an integrated understanding of the patient’s world – that is, their whole person, 
emotional needs, and life issues; c) finds common ground on what the problem is and 
mutually agrees on management; d) enhances prevention and health promotion; and e) 
enhances the continuing relationship between the patient and the doctor” (p. 445). 
 In reviewing both descriptions of PCM – both Stewart’s description and the 
opposite-oriented description of Bardes and Bensing – these concepts seem quite 
familiar.  It becomes clear that PCM simply describes a way of thinking about medicine 
itself – a way that was just described in its totality.  All of these attitudes about 
medicine seem to be practical implications of our conception of the actual project of 
medicine.  Essentially, the term ‘patient centered medicine’ just describes the kind of 
medicine that would be practiced by our ideal doctor. Unlike EBM, a doctor can’t really 
practice PCM – they can agree with it or adopt the ideas of it, but as stated, it is really 
more of an attitude about medicine than an approach to practicing medicine.  While 
discussions surrounding PCM do contain some useful ideas about health and medicine, 
none of them explicitly address how the doctor is to actualize these goals, or what the 
ideas really mean. 
So, where does this leave us in the greater scheme of the project?  If PCM doesn’t 
serve as a way for the doctor to reconcile biological health with overall Health in the 
patient, then where are we to turn? 
 It seems that a reexamination of the ways PCM is described may shed some light 
on the issue.  As stated, PCM is always characterized in terms of holistic health and a 
more patient-controlled clinical setting.  Obviously, the first of these two issues has 
been extensively explored.  But the second has not – the question of the relationship.  
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In searching for a practical way to determine each individual’s conception of being, it 
was misguided to look at a medical paradigm in order to derive how to do so.  In reality, 
it is the subject-subject interaction between the patient and doctor that must be 
examined in order to explore the way by which the doctor can explore the patient’s 
notions of biological health and overall Health. 
 And this does seem to make sense, in light of the discussion of EBM.  It became 
quite clear that the individuality of each clinical encounter is something that cannot be 
systematized or fully explained by a single paradigm.  Rather, each clinical interaction 
needs to be examined individually.  For the sake of improving biological health, this 
individuality is important insofar as it recognizes the uniqueness of each patient’s body.  
In order to embrace individuality from this perspective, the important thing was to 
understand the fact that each patient has a different biological/physiological structure.  
But in order to embrace the individuality of the patient in an attempt to establish a 
notion of overall Health, and to make biological decisions in light of that, it only makes 
sense that the doctor patient interaction is examined beyond the physical level. 
 Hence, the assumption that EBM and PCM were going to be two components of 
medicine that are to coincide in order to achieve full and effective medicine was wrong.  
Rather, one component of medicine is based on biological manipulation, which is to be 
achieved through the means discussed in the section on EBM, which strives to improve 
the biological side of a person’s being.  The other side is entirely based on the 
relationship – a systematic approach or ‘paradigm’ cannot achieve something so 
specific and individualistic.  In order to realize a person’s notion of being, a one-on-one 
interaction between two people must take place.  And that is what will be examined in 
the following section. 
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Section 4: Models for the Clinical Interaction 
 Through most of the previous discussion, it has become clear that the project of 
the physician, as a whole, can only be understood in terms of each individual clinical 
interaction between the doctor and the patient.  Furthermore, it has become clear that 
any attempt to objectively systematize medicine is not only ineffective, but also 
dangerous, as seen in the case of the pure evidence based medical paradigm.  Even 
from a biological perspective, the individuality of the patient’s situation always has to 
be taken into account – every medical decision must occur by means of a specific 
analysis of the unique case at hand.  That is, cases are not to be thought of or described 
as a case of x or y, but rather the case.  So, prior to any assertions about subjectivity or 
the actual relationship, the specific clinical encounter is still to be valued in terms of 
absolute importance in the project of medicine.  As we have come to see, it really is 
impossible, or at lease useless, to discuss medicine without discussing the specific 
clinical interaction.   
In this section, the specific nature of that clinical interaction will be explored in 
light of the previous discussion on health and being, in order to determine the nature of 
the most effective clinical interaction.  Referring to the previously proposed model of 
overall health, we will attempt to isolate and identify a specific kind of clinical 
interaction in which the patient’s own notion of holistic Health can be most readily and 
effectively brought to light, so that decisions about biological health can be made 
effectively.   
 Before starting the discussion, I find it important to clarify the use of the term 
‘relationship.’  Soon after considering the clinical interaction, it seems to become 
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imperative to discuss the relationship between the doctor and patient.  But this is not 
necessarily the best way to understand the interaction.  The term ‘relationship’ already 
implies a certain kind of interaction between doctor and patient.  And although our 
previous discussion of health, and the nature of health and being, would suggest that 
the interaction must develop into a relationship, it is not the case that all ways of 
conceptualizing the clinical interaction involve a relationship in the full sense of the 
word.  Using the term relationship implies that there is a meaningful connection 
between two people, but in some ways of conceptualizing the clinical setting, this 
meaningful connection does not come to exist.   
 At the outset of the discussion, we are left with a major question that must be 
addressed before we can start – how are we to classify different kinds of medical 
interactions?  With some thought, one issue emerges as the preeminent feature used to 
classify many interpersonal interactions, especially ones that center around a decision 
making process involving two individuals – the issue of power.  And because of the 
specific aforementioned nature of the clinical interaction, namely that it inherently 
involves a decision making process, the question of power can be considered 
synonymous with the more specific question of autonomy.   
Autonomy really is the central feature of any interaction that involves a mutual 
decision between two people – the interaction cannot be thought of without it, and it is 
the ultimate feature that will decide how decisions are made.  The importance of 
autonomy in any interaction is elucidated when one considers government – all 
governments are classified according to the level of autonomy amongst the ruling 
versus the ruled.  It makes sense that the clinical interaction is almost always 
conceptualized and organized in the literature according to this concept of autonomy.  
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Hence, an examination of autonomy in the relationship will serve as the first step 
towards identifying the nature of the most effective clinical interaction, and as a way of 
organizing or dividing clinical interactions into kinds. 
It is also important to note that each of these models results in a different notion 
of health, by its nature.  That is, as autonomy changes, so does the functional notion of 
health.  This movement will not be linear through the discussion.  Rather, the health 
conceptualization will be more objective and biologically-rooted in the models where 
autonomy is one-sided (the first and last model), and will be more subjective and 
holistic where the autonomy is shared.  This will turn out to be a major factor in 
determining which model is most effective. 
 In order to explore this concept of autonomy in the interaction, we will explore 
five different ideal models of the clinical setting.  In the discussion, we will move from a 
model in which the physician dominates the autonomy towards one in which the 
patient is mainly autonomous.  It is to be noted that these models may have different 
names in the literature, or may be described slightly differently by different authors, 
but there are commonly four major models that describe the main categories for kinds 
of autonomous medical interactions.  I’ve decided to include an extra, less common 
model because it serves as a useful middle ground between the two sides (patient-
controlled and doctor controlled).  The five models, moving from doctor as autonomous 
to patient as autonomous, are9: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Emanuel and Emanuel provide a very clear and concise explanation of the models of 
the relationship – this is the model that the discussion will largely be based off of, as it 
has been widely accepted in the medical community as a valid representation of the 
clinical interaction.  Childress and Siegler also provide some useful insight as to how 
these models can be understood.	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1. The paternalistic/parental/priestly model 
2. The deliberative/friendship model 
3. The negotiation model 
4. The interpretive/partnership model 
5. The informative/engineering model 
 
The Paternalistic Model 
 
 The paternalistic model of medicine, also called parental or priestly, is the classic 
way of conceptualizing the interaction between doctor and patient.  Although the name 
seems to suggest that this model is inherently based on a relationship, this is ironically 
one of the interaction models that I find very non-relationship based.  In this classic 
model, the doctor serves as the absolute controller of the decision making process – the 
physician, as expert, makes decisions according to an objective set of medical values, 
and the patient is to respect those decisions and follow the doctor’s orders.  It is 
expected that the patient will consent to “the physician’s determination of what’s best” 
(Emanuel and Emanuel, p. 2221).  Because health value is seen as objective and 
absolute, it is only the physician who can make the best decisions regarding health – he 
is to use his expertise and training in order to isolate a problem and come up with the 
best solution.  Clearly, this model does not rely on much patient input at all.  The 
patient’s only job in the interaction is to objectively inform the physician of his 
symptoms.  Decisions about treatment are made without any subjective influence from 
the patient – the patient’s role is simply to carry out the doctor’s instructions as 
precisely as possible. 
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 Under the paternalistic model, the interaction between doctor and patient does 
not leave room for the generation of a meaningful relationship.  But if the interaction 
were to be conceptualized in terms of a relationship, I think the model of the father or 
priest with son or worshipper is misguided to describe it.  The interaction does seem to 
be paternal or priestly in that the patient must have absolute trust and reverence 
towards the physician, as in the case of the father or priest, but the suggesting of a 
father/child relationship implies more than just one of reverence and order following.  
The so-called paternalistic model of the interaction does not entail the nuances of the 
relationship between a father and his child.  There is no implication of mutual care or 
empathy, nor is there any sort of meaningful communication that takes place.  Hence, I 
think it would be more useful to think of this type of interaction as the kind between a 
soldier and his commanding officer.  The soldier respects the knowledge and capability 
of his commanding officer, and takes orders from him without inputting any subjective 
influence.  This seems to be more representative of the way the patient and doctor 
interact in the paternalistic model – it is cold and objective, and does not rely on a close 
relationship in the full sense. 
 
The Deliberative Model 
  
 The movement from the paternalistic model to the deliberative model 
constitutes a large shift in the way the interaction works.  The patient’s influence is 
introduced in this model, but the doctor still retains a good share of autonomy in the 
relationship.  In the deliberative model, the doctor informs the patient of the totality of 
their clinical situation, and seeks to persuade the patient to make decisions that he (the 
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physician) deems best.  In order to do so, the physician must fully explain the situation 
to the patient, taking into account all of the subjective criteria that may be at stake.  The 
doctor must have an informed conversation with the patient in order to identify what 
goals would seem best in this specific instance for this specific patient. 
 This model of the interaction acknowledges the fact that health is not an 
objective, universally understood issue.  A conception of health is explored, given the 
situation, according to the specific ongoing in a patient’s life.  However, in the 
deliberative interaction, the doctor ultimately seeks to make a final decision on what he 
thinks is the right option in terms of decision making.  Although he does take the 
subject into account in the process of deciding, the doctor will ultimately try to 
persuade the patient to make one decision over another – this model seems to open 
health to some subjectivity, but it still holds on to the objective health value of the 
paternalistic model.  It is often noted that decisions ultimately belong to the patient, 
and that coercion is to be avoided, but the doctor still makes a clear and strong effort to 
inform the patient of what to do – the doctor seems to have an attitude that he knows 
the true objective nature of health, but that he doesn’t have the right to impose that 
notion on the patient. 
 In the deliberative model, there is definitely a strong relationship developed 
between physician and patient.  Although that relationship is often characterized as 
friendship, I think it is more useful to characterize this model as paternalistic – or 
maybe motherly – but between a parent and an adult offspring.  The relationship here 
is very intense, and extensive communication takes place in the interaction, leading to 
the development of a strong relationship.  But what makes it parental, to me, is the fact 
that the doctor still believes that he ‘knows best’ for the patient, just as the parent 
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always thinks that he or she knows what is best for the child.  Illuminating the model in 
this way seems to make it a bit less mutual, at least ideologically.  Even though the 
patient has the final say on what he or she is to do with his or her health, the attempt by 
the physician to tell him or her what he should do seems to be an imposition, similar to 
the way the mother and father seem to impose on the decision making process of their 
adult child.  Just as the child of the parent will assert that he is an adult, and that he 
knows what is best for his own life, it seems that the patient would, or should, do the 
same.  This will be discussed in more depth in the discussion. 
 
The Negotiation Model 
 
 The negotiation model is rather uncommon and unorthodox – it is put forth by 
Childress and Siegler as a way of ‘leveling the playing field,’ as it were, between the 
physician and patient.  That is, it seeks to generate a model of medicine in which 
neither doctor nor patient is autonomous.  In this model, it is assumed that the doctor 
and patient may both have their own individual interests – just as a patient may have a 
presupposed notion of health, the doctor may have one as well.   In these 
circumstances, according to the negotiation model, neither party has to submit to the 
assertions of the other.  Rather, the two should have a conversation in which they both 
put forward their view, and come to a mutual decision on a hybrid version of the overall 
decision.  Hence, this model acknowledges the subjectivity involved in any 
understanding of health, but does not seek to put either the doctor or the patient in the 
right. 
 In order to come to a mutually agreeable decision, the doctor and patient would 
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both be required to put forth the entirety of their idea of health, and propose an 
argument for their understanding of the current situation.  Interestingly, Childress and 
Sielger believe this to be especially effective because it allows for notions of health to 
change and evolve over time.  It seems that this model is an attempt to acknowledge 
how unique each clinical interaction is – rather than setting a standard way of viewing 
autonomy, it is proposed that the autonomy can and should shift according to the 
specific situation.  In other words, the relationship between the doctor and patient can 
be controlled by the doctor in some instances, and by the patient in others.  It is a 
model that does not tie autonomy to either party, but rather conceptualizes the 
relationship in terms of a constant flux of autonomy from one interaction to another.  
By acknowledging this movement from interaction to interaction, the negotiation 
model seems to bridge the gap between the two parties.  But whether or not this model 
is effectively useful will be discussed in more detail later in the discussion. 
 
The Interpretive Model 
 
 The interpretive model, as I see it, seems to be a slightly more patient-controlled 
version of the deliberative model.  In the interpretive model, the physician still seeks to 
help the patient identify a specific notion of health within the context of the situation at 
hand, and help the patient come to a decision regarding these matters.  It is the job of 
the physician, according to this model, to elucidate the medical issues clearly, so that 
the patient can fully understand the situation, and to engage in a conversation with the 
patient in order to bring the patient’s own understanding of the issue to light.  
Similarly, the physician will seek to identify a set of goals with regard to any given 
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condition, taking the subjective will of the patient into account.  Unlike the deliberative 
physician, however, the interpretive physician stops there – there is no attempt to 
persuade the patient to make one decision over another, regardless of the physician’s 
own inclinations or beliefs. 
 Clearly, the interpretive physician realizes the subjective nature of health.  But 
unlike the deliberative physician, the interpretive physician does not believe that he is 
to impose on an understanding of health.  That is, the interpretive physician views 
health as an entirely subjective notion, while the deliberative physician views health as 
somewhat subjective, but still retaining some form of objective value.  Because of this 
belief, the interpretive physician will only seek to elucidate a notion of health within the 
patient – it is accepted that often times, health is not a clear cut issue, and it requires a 
fair amount of clarification and discussion before one can arrive at an absolute 
understanding of what one thinks is best with regards to health decisions. 
 The interpretive model of the interaction is, like the deliberative, inherently 
based on a relationship – it is only through intimate conversation that the physician 
can help the patient arrive at a full and acceptable notion of health.  To me, this model 
is the one that should be characterized by friendship, although Emanuel and Emanuel 
characterize it as a partnership or a relationship between advisor and advisee.  The two 
thinkers take the physician’s lack of effort to input his own subjective belief as a lack of 
care on behalf of the physician, in that one may conceptualize the physician as ‘allowing 
the patient to make a bad decision.’  But I think this is very misguided – with a more 
full understanding of health, it is clearly acknowledged that subjectivity in these 
decisions must be embraced in their entirety, though this will be discussed later in 
detail.  In my view, the interpretive model is more representative of a friendship than 
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any other model – it stresses mutual respect and mutual care.  According to Childress 
and Siegler’s account, the friendship model is similar to the deliberative model, but it is 
different in that it “stresses the intensity of the relationship” (p.21).  The doctor shows 
respect for the patient’s autonomy, while the patient shows respect for the doctor’s 
ability to describe the situation and help them arrive at a notion of being, even though 
the patient has the ultimate say on the course of his or her treatment. 
 
The Informative Model 
 
 In terms of autonomy, the informative model represents the opposite of the 
paternalistic model – it is a conception of the interaction that gives the patient absolute 
autonomy in the decision making process, severely limiting the role of the physician.  
Other ways of describing this model are as technician or engineer’s model, viewing the 
physician as an expert in human biological systems.  In the informative model, the 
physician simply analyzes the patient and gives him or her information regarding the 
situation at hand – the patient then makes decisions according to the objective criteria 
put forth by the physician.  In no way does the physician have any influence in the 
decisions that are made – the job of the physician is simply to inform the patient what 
the situation is, and what possible treatments there are.  As stated by Emanuel and 
Emanuel, “There is no role for the physician’s values, the physician’s understanding of 
the patient’s values, or his or her worth of the patient’s values” (p.2221). 
The model adopts an interesting, yet somewhat confusing, notion of health.  In 
one sense, the physician is understood as a biological expert, and nothing more.  That 
is, the physician is nothing more than a textbook – simply explaining certain biological 
	   
71 
conditions, options for procedures, and statistical outcomes.  In this sense, health 
seems entirely objective and biological.  But on the other hand, the patient is the one 
who ultimately decides what to do.  This seems to go against the objective notion of 
health – understanding health as biological and objective, it would seem that the 
patient would rely on the doctor to choose the best procedure.  The fact that the patient 
ultimately decides on what to be done seems to suggest that health is more subjective, 
but that the physician is not to be involved in the generation of health itself.   
It is unclear what notion of health is adopted here.  On one hand, it seems that 
health is to be understood as objective, but that the patient is making the assertion that 
he or she is just as competent as the physician in the process of identifying effective 
procedures to achieve that objective goal.  But on the other hand, it seems that the 
patient may be asserting that the physician is not to be involved in the notion of health 
– that health is entirely subjective, and that it is only the doctor’s job to give 
information about a person’s biology, not to help them develop health in any way but a 
physical one.  The first of these two possibilities seems to be misinformed and 
somewhat silly – there is no way that a patient could make decisions about their 
objective biological condition more effectively than someone who does it for a living.  
And the second possibility seems to make sense, but to be somewhat overconfident in 
its ideology.  That is, it is possible for someone to think that they don’t need the 
doctor’s input in the attempt to identify health values in given situations.  If this were 
the case, it seems that this model diminishes the conceived role of the physician, but 
does not move toward an objective notion of health. 
Regardless, conceptualizing the interaction in these terms clearly leads to a 
situation that is as sterile and cold, if not more sterile and cold, than the one generated 
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in the paternalistic model.  There seems to be no relationship here at all – this notion of 
the physician is no different than a computer.  The patient retains all autonomy – there 




 In light of our previous discussion on health, the efficacy of some of these 
models is fairly easy to judge.  The paternalistic model, to start with, is clearly 
ineffective in achieving a whole notion of health.  It completely disregards the idea that 
the patient has to realize his or her own notion of Health and being before any medical 
decision can be made, drawing on the false assumption that Health, as a whole, is 
strictly biological.  The paternalistic model seems to be the one used by physicians who 
rely solely on EBM, viewing conclusions drawn from research and statistical 
observations as dogmatic ways of representing how to achieve health.  It is this model 
that much of the ‘PCM’ movement is rallying against – many view this model as an 
unacknowledged infringement on patient rights, and assert that overly aggressive 
assertion by the doctor is unethical (Goodyear-Smith and Buetow). 
 The informative model is also quite troubling, though for a different reason.  The 
interpretive model completely skews the conception of medicine that we’ve been 
working toward.  The model relies on a very unclear idea of health, and completely 
devalues the importance of the physician’s role in medicine. Furthermore, it ignores the 
fact that the physician is the only one who can most effectively make decisions 
regarding biological health.  That is, even if a person came in with a clear and well-
thought out understanding of their life and what it is to be in good Health, there is no 
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way that the patient would be able to effectively align that notion with a medical 
procedure (at least in many circumstances).  That is, even if someone comes in without 
a doubt in their mind as to what their own subjective notion of Health is, if he or she is 
confronted with the decision to choose between complex procedures. There will still be 
a necessary conversation that would occur between the doctor and patient with regards 
to the alignment of that notion with the outcomes of the procedures.   
In other words, there is no way that a patient could immediately learn 
everything about a single procedure based on objective information.  Medical 
procedures are extremely complicated and nuanced – the doctor’s input is absolutely 
necessary in the attempt to clarify and elucidate the way in which outcomes will affect 
each individual.  Hence, it is not realistic to call the model ‘purely informative’ – there 
may be cases in which an interaction can be informative (you have an infection – you 
can take antibiotic A or B), but any complex clinical situation necessarily requires a 
more detailed and nuanced conversation.  That is, even the patient who ‘believes in’ the 
informative model will enter the realm of the interpretive model in a more complex 
situation. 
 The deliberative model seems to be quite close to an effective way of actualizing 
our notion of health.  Many scholars, including Emanuel and Emanuel, support this 
model as one that embraces mutual autonomy most effectively.  The model has been 
conceptualized as a way to give the patient their fair share of control in the interaction, 
while still retaining the understanding that the physician is ultimately the professional 
(Chin).  In keeping the ‘benefits’ of paternalism – namely, an assertion that health goals 
should entail some ‘objectivity’ – the ‘integrity’ of medicine stays in tact.  But in the 
acknowledgment of the individuality of the patient, the specific case is examined, 
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taking the whole situation of the subject into account.  In this sense, the deliberative 
model seems to expand a notion of health, while holding on to some objective basis. 
 Although I think the deliberative model is a movement in the right direction, as 
it were, I don’t think it does so in a particularly useful way.  It seems that this model 
acknowledges that there is some sort of duality that goes on in our conception of 
medicine, but does not do enough to elucidate just what that duality is.  That is, the 
deliberative model seems to lack philosophical basis.  It ignores the necessity to 
examine the nature of that confusing fragmentation in our overall understanding of 
Health, and because of this, the solution is not very well thought out – it seems that the 
assertion is simply that there should be something objective, at least in some way, 
about health, but that it is also subjective, in some other way.  The way the deliberative 
model goes about reconciling this confusion is by simply addressing the ideas of 
physician and patient as different in some way, assuming that the physician knows the 
objective side of health while the patient knows the subjective side.  Clearly, as 
discussed in the section on health, the distinction is not so simple. 
 The interpretive model seems to make the same mistake, though I believe this 
model comes closest to addressing health as we have conceived it.  The interpretive 
model stresses the importance of a realization of the notion of health by the patient, 
and also stresses the importance of the physician in accomplishing this.  At first glance, 
it seems that the interpretive physician does exactly what we’ve asserted the physician 
is supposed to do – elucidate a personal notion of Health – and this is true.  But once 
again, the lack of a clear definition of health leads to a shortcoming.  Although the 
physician can effectively arrive at a notion of Health through this model, it is not so 
clear that he can actually improve the biological side of health through this model.  The 
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way it is described by Emanuel and Emanuel, the informative model leaves the 
physician in a place where he has almost no say in the deliberation process.  That is, 
although the informative physician will do an admirable job of allowing his patient to 
come to their own subjective understanding of biological health and overall Health, he 
also allows them total license in choosing a medical procedure – he has no input at all.  
This does not seem right, given the previous discussion of EBM – the doctor must have 
input in choosing the actual course of action, while basing this off of the patient’s 
conception of Health. 
 This central flaw (the lack of doctor autonomy in choosing actual medical 
procedures) can be viewed, in a way, as the other side of the deliberative model’s 
central flaw.  It seems that the deliberative model wants to suggest that the physician is 
the only one who knows best in terms of the improvement of biological health, but that 
it ignores the fact that the patient’s notions are central – not the physician’s.  Speaking 
of our preconceived notion of health, it seems that the deliberative model is able to 
improve upon biological health most effectively, but that the informative model is able 
to generate more useful medical decisions based on a whole conception of Health. 
 There must be some way to reconcile these two models, drawing the beneficial 
parts from each.  And in order to do so, we have to return to the central notion of 
autonomy.  It seems to me that a fundamental flaw in the analysis or description of 
these models in the literature is that it ignores the fact that there are different parts to 
the clinical interaction.  Once this is understood, one doesn’t have to label the overall 
interaction in terms of autonomy, but rather, parts of the interaction.  It seems that the 
negotiation model made a good move in attempting to assert that each individual 
interaction must vary, even between the same physician and patient – but I seek to take 
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this one step further, and assert that each part of the interaction must vary in terms of 
autonomy. 
 I think the nature of decision-making needs to be more closely examined in 
order to elucidate these different parts.  Every decision involves two fundamental steps.  
The first step is the realization of a desired outcome, and the second is an action that 
strives to achieve that outcome.  In terms of medicine, the realization of the desired 
outcome is obviously the process by which one comes to understand their own notion 
of Health, and hence their notion of biological health.  The action that strives to achieve 
that notion of health is the actual medical procedure.  Understanding the decision 
making process in this way, it becomes clear that the patient holds the autonomy in the 
process of defining their notion of Health, but that the physician holds autonomy in 
deciding on how to achieve that goal, or in other words, the physician should have the 
final say on the actual medical procedure.  Hence, the deliberative model is flawed in its 
assertion that the doctor should influence the patient’s actual understanding of health, 
but the interpretive model is flawed in its assertion that the physician shouldn’t have 
autonomy in the process of choosing a procedure.   
 Now, this is not to say that the autonomy is to be held in full in each of the 
respective parts of the decision making process.  There obviously can, and will, be ways 
in which the doctor is involved in the derivation of the notion of being, and similarly 
ways in which the patient is involved in the choosing of a procedure.  But this cross-
involvement should be limited, and should respect the autonomy of the other.  For 
instance, the doctor may prod or ask questions in order to elucidate a notion of being, 
and at the same time, a patient can voice concerns about different procedures for 
different reasons.  But in each of these cases, it should be done with a level of respect 
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for the other – the doctor must acknowledge that the patient is an expert on his or her 
life, and at the same time, the patient must acknowledge that the doctor is an expert on 
medical practice.  To clarify, it should never be the case that the doctor makes a blatant 
assertion about what the patient should want.  And similarly, the patient should never 
tell the doctor which procedure is best for their desired outcome.   
It is this model that serves as the most effective – one that acknowledges the 
dual nature of the decision-making process, and does not try to attribute all autonomy 
in the interaction to one party.  Clearly, the patient and the doctor are both experts, 
albeit on very different topics.  The two must recognize and respect their positions in 
the interaction, and respect each other’s level of expertise.  Through this understanding 
of the clinical interaction, the doctor will ultimately be ale to achieve the goal – by 
effectively communicating with each patient on an individual basis, while maintaining 
this firm understanding of the way the autonomy is to be distributed in the interaction, 
the doctor will be able to make confident medical decisions that are soundly rooted in 













 Arriving at the end of the Section 4, it seems that both major goals of this project 
have finally been realized.  It is hopefully clear by now that Part I was successful in 
defining the telos of the physician in medical practice.  To clarify one last time, it was 
decided that the two major aspects of the physician’s role are 1) to come to a specific 
understanding of the way each patient conceptualizes the interplay between biological 
health and overall Health (or in other words, attempt to understand the patient’s 
overall conception of being), and 2) to improve upon the biological health of their 
patient.  In addition, the physician is to remember that his ultimate goal is to establish 
overall Health, and he is to do whatever he can to accomplish that goal.   
 Part II was also rather successful in establishing the answer to the ‘how’ 
question.  It was concluded that in order to most effectively realize a subjective notion 
of Health in the patient, the doctor must address each patient as a free-thinking 
subject, while keeping a clear understanding of the way the relationship and decision 
making process is supposed to work.  Furthermore, in order to improve upon biological 
health in the patient, it was made clear that the doctor must always remember the 
individuality of his patient, must rely on his own intuition above all else, and must 
never blindly adhere to a systematic approach to medicine.  
 According to the outline of the paper in the introduction, the project was 
definitely successful – a description of medicine’s telos, as well as a description of the 
way the doctor is to actualize that goal, has been formulated.  Clearly, this was the goal 
of the paper.  But looking back, if we delve beyond the content of the text, and towards 
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the actual movement that was made in order to come to these assertions, an even more 
interesting conclusion comes to light. 
 At the outset, we began by examining several preexisting notions of what it 
means to be healthy.  We delved into the assertions of different scientists and 
philosophers, referencing different books and articles, in an attempt to learn from 
others.  We gathered as much knowledge about health as we could, in an attempt to  
come to know what medicine is.  Different assertions were made about the ideas – we 
agreed with some, disagreed with others.  But regardless, the object of the first section 
was to establish a knowledge base upon which we could build the rest of our project. 
 In the second section, we reexamined that entire knowledge base – the 
assertions made in the previous section were scrutinized and analyzed.  We grappled 
with the different concepts that we had just learned about in an attempt to make our 
own idea – to come to understand what was really going on beyond the academic 
debate.  Despite all we learned, we made a strong attempt to come to our own 
understanding, thinking beyond what had already been stated. 
 In the third section, we began our search for the correct way to practice – the 
best system of medicine.  But in each of the two, we found some fatal flaws.  It seemed 
that there was no way to accept a single, structured paradigm.  Clearly, systematized 
medical practice was detrimental and useless.  Nonetheless, we learned a good amount 
from the flaws of the ideology before moving away from the systematic and towards the 
individualistic. 
 Within the analysis of the clinical setting, it quickly became clear that a positive 
relationship between doctor and patient was absolutely paramount to good medical 
practice.  Although we came to understand the general attitude that the doctor must 
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have in the clinical setting, the nuanced skills – the ways by which the doctor can 
actualize his goal – are still left to be explored.  This part of the ‘how’ question seems 
impossible to answer in full – there can always be another way for the doctor to do his 
job better, both in terms of biological health and in terms of his generating a notion of 
holistic Health. 
 Clearly, this was originally intended to be an external philosophical analysis of 
the way medicine works.  But looking back upon the project, it seems that it became 
more than just an external inquiry – it seems to have become a kind of 
phenomenological experience.  That is, the education that we received in the movement 
through this paper can be seen as a direct analogue to the way a reflective doctor 
should move through his education and career.   
The first section can be seen as analogous to the physician’s experience in 
medical school, starting from scratch, examining the theories of others in order to build 
up a knowledge base, which could be used for the rest of his project in medicine.   
The second section can be seen as the physician’s attempt to sort through the 
different theories and notions that he learned in school in order to come up with his 
own conception of what medicine really is.  In this stage of his career, the physician 
seeks to establish a true basis of his project, based on all of the knowledge acquired in 
school, just as we attempted to find greater meaning in these preexisting notions of 
health. 
The third section can be seen as the physician’s experience in residency – the 
physician enters the practical realm, and into a structured system of medicine that 
relies upon hierarchy and protocol, just as we entered the realm of medical paradigms 
which were similarly structured.  Just as we did in the discussion,  the reflective 
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physician will ultimately realize the inadequacy of the system.  Through his experience, 
the physician will come to realize the importance of the individual clinical interaction. 
Section four can be seen as the physician’s movement away from the 
systematization of the residency experience and towards a more individualistic kind of 
clinical medicine.  As we did in the movement through this section, the physician will 
ultimately come to realize the best way to interact with his patients.  Furthermore, he 
will come to realize that he can always improve upon his project, just as we realize that 
we can always expand upon this paper.  
The reason why this parallelism is so important is because it shows just how 
much philosophical thought the field of medicine demands of the physician.  In order 
to be a truly adequate physician, one must never stop examining his situation, never 
stop questioning his teachings, and never stop asking which elements about his 
practice are good, and which are bad.  Only the reflective physician can be a decent 
physician, regardless of technical skill or training.  The ability to think deeply and 
reflectively is a fundamental attribute of any good physician – and it is a quality that 
the physician must never lose.  Regardless of technological advancement, we cannot 
forget that the field of medicine deals with the fundamental element of humanity – 
being.  The physician truly is an ontologist, and he must recognize himself as such. 
 In conclusion, if nothing else is taken away from this project, it is my hope that 
the reader has realized one fundamental reality: we must think philosophically about 
medicine.  Throughout this project, it has not been my intention to lead the western 
world to an enlightened understanding of the entire field of medicine, nor has it been 
my goal to make a groundbreaking assertion about ontology or intersubjectivity.  The 
content of the paper is certainly important, in that it raises questions and concerns, and 
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makes a few suggestions about medicine.  But even if the reader disagrees with every 
claim I’ve made in the text, I hope that he or she will still recognize – by the simple 
process of reading through this paper – that medicine is necessarily more than just 
science or technology, and demands an immense amount of thought, both from the 
behalf of the physician and the patient.  In dealing with the lives – the Being – of 
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